Editorial | Articles about Cambodia | Khmer

Saturday, November 08, 2008

South-East Asian countries seek economic integration

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South-East Asian countries seek economic integration


(lefrt-right) Prime Ministers Thein Sein from Myanmar, Samchai Wongsawat from Thailand, Nguyen Tan Dung from Vietnam, Hun Sen from Cambodia and Bouasone Bouphavanh from Laos at a summit summit in Hanoi (AFP/Hoang Dinh Nam)


Business News (monstersandcritics.com)
Nov 7, 2008

Hanoi - The global financial crisis might bring economic benefits for countries in South-East Asia, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen said Friday at a regional summit in Hanoi.

'The rich people in Europe, the buyers in America will not buy expensive clothes produced in Europe anymore but the cheaper goods produced in Cambodia and Vietnam,' Sen said.

Most of the other businessmen and political leaders at the summit focused on the need to integrate South-East Asian economies to create a larger market more resilient to economic shocks.

They met at the Arrawaddy-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy summit, which brings together Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam in a rivers-related regional development forum initiated by former Thai prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra in 2003.

The vice chairman of the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce, Hoang Van Dung, said the five countries should focus on harmonizing regulations, eliminating duplicate customs inspections and creating a single regional travel card to promote tourism.

Oknha Kith Meng, president of the Cambodian Chamber of Commerce, said the region should expect severe economic challenges as reduced demand in their wealthy export markets made itself felt.

'These problems that we face are not of our making,' Meng said. 'However, we have to expect that our economies will be buffeted by this global storm.'

Myanmar Prime Minister Thein Sein hailed the establishment of an East-West transit corridor to link his country's Indian Ocean coastline with Vietnam's ports on the South China Sea. Sein also said the regional development forum had played a role in encouraging Thai investment in Myanmar, which reached 4 billion dollars in the past fiscal year, which ended in March.

Thai Prime Minister Somchai Wongsawat said the regional road network constructed under a framework called GMS was nearly complete but said better customs coordination and more industrial zones along the transit network were still needed.

Somchai called on forum members to enhance 'self-reliance' within the region, to create more intraregional trade and cushion the impact of the global financial crisis.

More than 350 business representatives from South-East Asia and the region's trading partners, including Japan, the United States, Russia and South Korea attended the conference.

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Thursday, April 10, 2008

Will the Cambodian Elections Be Open?

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Cambodian Minister Asks Vietnam 'To Assist' in Maintaining Security in Election


Cambodia thanks Vietnam for military assistance

Will the Cambodian Elections Be Open?
By LENG Sovady

Previous News:
Cambodian Minister Asks Vietnam 'To Assist' in Maintaining Security in Election
Cambodia thanks Vietnam for military assistance

Will the general elections on July 27, 2008, for the fourth term of office be fair ? The study of the election legislation and recent events prove people’s choice will be under diverse pressures and intimidations as well as election frauds.

On the past 25th of March, the minister of Defence of the Royal government led by Mr Hun Sen, Mr Tea Banh visited the president of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Mr Nguyen Minh Triet. On this occasion, Mr Tea Banh warmly thanked Vietnam for its military support to drive Pol Pot out in 1979. And he asked for a Vietnamese military support to insure law and order during the elections.

The military support in 1979 turned into the occupation of Cambodia, which became Vietnam’s slave as a compensation for the spending. The occupying army looted the rest of the national wealth after Pol Pot’s rule and notably, furniture, precious stones, factories, doors, windows, all things transportable and so on…

And Vietnam uselessly imposed on the Cambodian people the “K5” policy for its military strategy, which caused 200,000 casualties and family disorganizations.
The treaty of Paris signed on October 23, 1991 and the election results in May 1993 under the aegis of UN were needed to get rid of this sturdy military support so praised by Mr Tea Banh.

He certainly knows all those ploys because he is a minister. His approach is disingenuous during the election period, and, moreover, the PPC, this minister’s party, is spreading the rumour that if the elections were lost for him, risks of civil war would be run. As the Cambodians are traumatized by the war, they could change their choice.

For the elections in 2003, Phnom Penh had threatened to use armed forces if protests were uttered like in 1998 against election fraud. This time, the authority is using other means like threatening with the occupation by Vietnamese forces, which reminds the Cambodians of the dark times from 1979 and 1991.

The general elections are organized by the National Election Committee (NEC) nominated by the council of ministers after the Home minister’s advice, according to the new article 13 of the election laws promulgated on December 26, 1997 and renewed on February 7, 2007 during the time when the PPC had absolute power after the collapse of FUNCIPEC following the coup on July 6, 1997. And then, this committee will nominate the local election commissions (new article 18). Eventually, after this commission’s proposition, the national election committee will nominate the election commission in the polling station, composed of a president, a vice-president, a secretary and two members (new article 22).

According to these laws, the election organisms should be neutral. But how could we believe in the neutrality of such organisms nominated by the authority?

This is a difference with the French practice. The political parties that participate in the elections, have only the right to send delegates as observers to the polling station (new article 26) and have not the right to take part in the election process. In France, the political parties may send assessors to participate in the election process from the opening time of the polling station onward and check the registers and electors’ identity.

If the Cambodian election legislation is applied, the election commission in the polling station could easily fraud if they were determined to do it because the party delegates have not the right to check the registers and the electors’ identity.
On these reports, protests in 1998 and 2003 were justified by the gaps in the legislation.

So, the national election committee should amend the present laws by enabling the political parties to send assessors for the voting process, so that the general elections should be really democratic. Otherwise, suspicion towards the committee’s neutrality and voting process transparency will persist.

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Saturday, March 29, 2008

Cambodian Minister Asks Vietnam 'To Assist' in Maintaining Security in Election

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Cambodian Minister Asks Vietnam 'To Assist' in Maintaining Security in Election
SEP20080328021006 Phnom Penh Agence Kampuchea Presse (Internet Version-WWW) in English 27 Mar 08
Vietnamese President Reiterates Good Ties With Cambodia

Phnom Penh, March 27, 2008 AKP --Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Tea Banh was received last Tuesday in Hanoi by Vietnamese State President Nguyen Minh Triet.

The State leader told Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister Tea Banh that the Party, State and people of Viet Nam have always prioritized the task of working together with Cambodia and Laos for a developed Indochinese peninsular.

General Tea Banh thanked Viet Nam for its great assistance in the past struggle to overthrow the Pol Pot genocidal regime and the current national development, Viet Nam News Agency (VNA) reported.

"The mature of the Cambodian Defense Ministry today is partially thanks to experiences drawn from Vietnamese experts on voluntary missions," VNA quoted Tea Banh as saying.

He also called on the Vietnamese Defense Ministry to assist and share experiences in maintaining security and public order in an effort to ensure Cambodia's legislative elections, scheduled for July, are a success.

General Tea Banh began a four-day official visit to Viet Nam on Mar. 24 at the invitation of Defense Minister General Phung Quang Thanh.

The Cambodian high-level military delegation embarked on talks with a host delegation led by Defense Minister Gen. Phung Quang Thanh immediately after a welcoming ceremony.
The two sides agreed to continue joint patrols at sea and exchange information on search and rescue operations. Talks also focused on the work of locating and repatriating remains of Vietnamese volunteers who died on Cambodian soil.
The two sides agreed on further exchanges of visits and stronger co-operation in personnel training between military hospitals and institutes from the two countries in order to fulfill high-level commitments to "good neighborliness, traditional friendship, comprehensive and long-term co-operation." --AKP

[Description of Source: Phnom Penh Agence Kampuchea Presse (Internet Version-WWW) in English -- Official government news agency run by the Information Ministry. Caters mostly to foreign audiences with occasional news items taken from foreign sources; root URL as of filing date: http://www.camnet.com.kh/akp]

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Thursday, March 27, 2008

Cambodia thanks Vietnam for military assistance

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Last Updated: Wednesday, March 26, 2008 10:46:46 Vietnam (GMT+07)
Source: VNA

Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister Tea Banh Tuesday thanked Vietnam for its past assistance in overthrowing the genocidal Pol Pot regime and its current help in developing Cambodia.

At a meeting with President Nguyen Minh Triet in Hanoi, General Tea Banh, who doubles as the country’s Defense Minister, said “the maturity of the Cambodian Defense Ministry today is partially thanks to … Vietnamese experts on voluntary missions.”

Triet said Vietnam always held cooperation with Cambodia and Laos as a high priority in developing the Indochinese peninsula.

Tea Banh began a four-day official visit to Vietnam Monday at the invitation of Vietnamese Minister of Defense General, Phung Quang Thanh.

During their meeting Tuesday, Banh and Thanh agreed to cooperate on locating and repatriating the remains of Vietnamese volunteers who died on Cambodian soil.

Banh asked the Vietnamese Ministry of Defense to share its experiences in maintaining security and public order and help Cambodia ensure the success of the country’s legislative elections in July.

The leaders agreed they would meet again in the future to strengthen cooperation in personnel training between military hospitals and institutes.

The two sides also agreed to continue joint sea patrols and exchange information on search and rescue operations.

Source: VNA

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Saturday, January 19, 2008

The Word Yuon

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By Navy Phim

I was reading Kenneth So's article on the word Yuon. I would like to submit my piece on it to your website also. It is an excerpt from my book "Reflections of a Khmer Soul." Please include at the end that it is an excerpt from my book and include my website on it too.

The word Yuon, like the term ethnic cleansing, has been a topic of many discussions in my journey. Yuon is a Khmer word that means Vietnamese. It is neither derogatory nor flattering. When my parents became friends with our Vietnamese-Cambodian neighbors, we called them Yuon. As we call Cambodia, Srok Khmer, we also called Vietnam Srok Yuon, land of the Yuon.

In "Khmer Language and the Term Yuon," Bora Touch argues:

To say that "yuon" means "savages," critics of the term are likely reliant on the Khmer Rouge's definition from KR Black Book (1978) p.9, a definition that is incorrect and baseless and was included by the KR for the purpose of propaganda. Some Khmer, including Khmer Krom, believe that "yuon" actually derives from "Yuonan," the Chinese word for Vietnam. Others believe it comes from the Yaun (Khan) dynasty, against whose armies both the Khmer and Cham did battle.

But in Cambodia, Yuon has somehow become a politically incorrect word that some view as derogatory.

Many Cambodian-Americans and local Cambodians disagree on the meaning of the word Yuon. If I were to accept that the meaning changed due to some occurrence in Cambodia and that people outside of Cambodia were out of the loop, I would hope that the world could accept that Yuon can still be used neutrally without a supposedly derogatory connotation. But I'm not convinced that the word has changed in meaning. I think people may change it for their own agenda. Unfortunately, it can bring misunderstanding and animosity when Yuon is used in Cambodia.

The new acceptable term for Yuon is Vietnam. As pronounced by Khmer people with our unique accent, it sounds like "Yak-nam," "Yak" being the mystical giant that eats humans. I prefer to think of my Vietnamese friends as Yuon rather than as blood-thirsty giants.

I also saw an Internet discussion asserting that the Laotian word for Vietnamese is Yuon or Kaew. To be able to live and have the dignity to use your language without others telling you that certain words have a negative connotation is a luxury that Cambodians do not have.
Excerpt from "Reflections of a Khmer Soul"
http://www.navyphim.com

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Wednesday, January 16, 2008

Is Using the Word "Yuon" Justified and Beneficial for Khmer?

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By Kenneth So

The issue of Westerners objecting to Khmers for calling a Vietnamese "Yuon" has come up over and over again since UNTAC came to Cambodia. We have been called racists for using this word.

I have written many articles responding to those accusations and even sent a letter to The Washington Times defending Mr. Sam Rainsy when this newspaper published a letter from Dr. David Roberts (Lecture from the school of History and International Affairs, University of Ulster, Northern Ireland) accusing Mr. Sam Rainsy as racist. Attached please see my letter that I wrote to the newspaper on September 20, 2002.

Because of the expenditure (time, energy, and political) we spend defending our position on this issue and get us back to full circle, I am rethinking my position on this subject. I will always defend our right to use the word "Yuon" to refer to a Vietnamese whenever we speak or write in Khmer. However, we have the choice to use the word "Yuon" whenever we write in English or speak to a Westerner, but is it prudent or beneficial for us to do so?

Before I express my position further on this subject, allow me first to educate the Westerners who think they really understand Khmer people.

There is no doubt in my mind that some Westerners know and understand the Khmer language very well. Some of them who have been staying in Cambodia for a long time may even feel that they know how Khmer people think and behave. However, I don’t believe that the understanding of a Khmer language alone and also living in Cambodia (some for a short and some for a long period of time) will truly open up the Khmer soul to Westerners. Khmerness is more than knowing the language and living in Cambodia. Khmerness is speaking the language, understanding Khmer idioms, appreciating Khmer jokes and their nuances, and enjoying Khmer musics and poetries. It is a feeling that resonates with the feelings of Khmer people living in Cambodia. A Khmer is a person that has never had the comfort and security that Westerners have in which they take it for granted. A Khmer is not synonymous with Pol Pot. The actions that Pol Pot had committed and the Western media description of his evilness have portrayed Khmer people as savage, uncivilized, and racist. A Khmer is a person who is proud of the civilization that Angkor has left as its legacy. Khmers are people that are constantly living under threat, both within and without the kingdom, who have witnessed the disappearance of Khmer territory to their powerful neighbors. If one does not have any of those feelings, one can never totally comprehend a Khmer.

Having said that, I will attempt to explain that the word "Youn" is not a racist word. The word "Youn" in a Khmer language is a neutral word. In general, when we call the Vietnamese "Youn", there is no malice intended.

I believe most Westerners’ confusion come from the fact that there is a word Vietnamese in the Western vocabulary. The misunderstanding is that for Khmer people to opt using the word "Youn" instead of the word Vietnamese give Westerners the impression that we are racists.

I think I can explain this. When we speak in Khmer, it is very awkward and does not sound right to the ear to use the word Vietnamese. However, when we speak in English or French then it is more natural to use the word Vietnamese and it would become awkward to use the word "Youn."

Let me give an example. If I want to say, "Fishermen are mostly Vietnameses" and I want to use both words, "Youn" and Vietnamese, to say that sentence in Khmer. In Khmer we would then say, "Pourk Neak Nisart Trey Keu Chreun Tè Youn" or "Pourk Neak Nisart Trey Keu Chreun Tè Choun Cheat Vietnam". It therefore requires more effort to use the word Vietnam to describe the Vietnamese because we have to say "Choun Cheat Vietnam" to describe a Vietnamese. We cannot say, "Pourk Neak Nisart Trey Keu Chreun Tè Vietnam" because Vietnam is a country. In Khmer, the word Vietnamese alone does not exist unless one uses the word "Youn."

It is rare in Khmer language to have a racist word attributed to different races. However, this does not mean that we don’t have a strong vocabulary that connotes racism. If we hate or disrespect somebody we would add an adjective "A" in front of the word that we intend to use. If we say "A Youn", then it is a sign or disrespect but not necessarily a racist remark. To be racist we would have to say "A Katop", "A Gnieung", or "A Sakei Daung." Some Westerners who compare the word "Youn" that we use to call a Vietnamese to the word Nigger that the Americans use to call a Black is completely misleading and show that they do not know really understand the Khmer language.

If we were to speak in Khmer and call the Vietnamese "A Katop", then I would consider it derogatory and racist in content. If we were to say, "Pourk Youn" or simply "Youn", meaning Vietnamese people or Vietnamese, respectively, then there is no reason for Westerners to condemn us for saying so. If we were to say, "A Youn", again it does not necessarily mean racism but rather a disrespectful way of calling a Vietnamese.

To show Westerners how a meaning is changed when we apply the adjective "A" in front of a sentence. For example, when a Khmer says, "Lombol Yo, Tveu Oy Ahgn Lours Proleung", which more or less means, "Son of a gun, you scare the hell out of me." Now, if I add "A" in front of the sentence such as, "A Lombol Yo, Tveu Oy Ahgn Lours Proleung", then the meaning is becoming more vulgar, which is equivalent to saying, "Son of a bitch, you scare the hell out of me."

I have a Khmer friend who is married to a Vietnamese woman. He calls his wife "Youn" all the time. He said, "Propaun khniom Youn", meaning my wife is Vietnamese. Is he racist then? If he is racist why would he marry a Vietnamese?

It is very dangerous for Westerners who do not know the intricacies and the little nuances of the Khmer language to theorize on the meaning of certain words or phrases. The misinterpretation or misunderstanding of the Khmer language can harm us tremendously.

Many Khmers feel that we should not bend and accommodate to the will and whim of the Westerners because of their ignorance. The inaptitude of the Westerners on the understanding of the usage of the word "Youn" reminds me of a recent case that took place in the United States. The teacher of a high school was using the word "Niggardly" to describe a person that is very stingy about his spending. Because of this, he was reprimanded and told not to use that word again because its sounds too much like the word Nigger.

Now that I have educated the Westerners, should I feel free to use the word "Yuon" from now on? Recently, a friend of mine made a comment that Khmers have used the word "Yuon" over centuries, as recently as during the Sangkum Reastr Niyum of Norodom Sihanouk both in newspapers and over the radio air waves. He further said, there should not be any reasons for Khmers to stop using the word "Yuon" because of complains from the international community and protest from the Vietnamese government that consider the word to be derogatory.

The above comment is fair. Now, let me state my position on this subject. As a pragmatist, I am looking for what is best for Cambodia as she moves into the 21st Century and into the era of internet and globalization.

As I try to remember, I don’t believe I have ever encountered the use of the word "Yuon" in French or English newspapers/magazines in Cambodia back during the era of Sangkum Reastr Niyum. I do not recall Khmers calling a Vietnamese "Yuon" when speaking in French. We, especially my family and I, always said "les vietnamiens et les chinois" and not "les yuons et les chens." However, I think it is still appropriate to us the word "Yuon" when speaking or writing in Khmer

Having said that, I will give my reasons why it is more beneficial for us to stop using the word "Yuon" whenever we speak or write in French or English.

Reason #1
Comparing the time during the Sangkum Reastr Niyum to today is not appropriate. Cambodia was relatively independent and self-sufficient during Sangkum Reastr Niyum. However, Cambodia of today is not independent because we receive about 50% of financial aids from foreign governments and the UN. Because we are at the mercy of foreign governments and the UN for our economic survival, therefore we cannot ignore advices or suggestions from them.

Reason #2
I believe the misunderstanding on the meaning of the word "Yuon" was caused by foreign advisors to Yasushi Akashi when he was the head of UNTAC in Cambodia. Those so-called foreign experts in Khmer language told Akashi that the word "Yuon" was a derogatory word. This misunderstanding then spread out like a wildfire. Now it is impossible to convince Westerners otherwise. We would have spent too much energy defending the usage of the word "Yuon" and reaching only a small percentage of the western population for our explanation. Do we have to defend our usage of the word "Yuon" every time a Westerner questions our intention? Can our valuable time be put to better use instead?

Reason #3
There are words in English or French for Vietnamese or Chinese. If we were to write in French or English and decide to use the word "Yuon" or "Chen" instead of the internationally recognizable words for Vietnamese and Chinese, then it is understandable that Westerners may get confused and think we are prejudiced and racist. Why do some Khmers insist on using the word "Yuon" or "Chen" when writing in French or English? What do we have to gain from using those words?

Reason #4
There are more Westerners and international newspapers and media in the world than in Cambodia. The international newspapers can reach a greater number of audiences in the world than we can. If western newspapers print out in their articles that we are racist because we use the word "Yuon" to label the Vietnamese, it will then reach a very large numbers of readers in the world. It is therefore impossible for us, Khmers, to target that many numbers of readers to counterbalance our view. Additionally, it is very hard to justify our usage of the word "Yuon" or "Chen" to the Westerners when there are acceptable replacements for those words in French or English that are used internationally by every country.

Reason #5
The perception and impression that we portray ourselves to the world are very important. If Westerners perceive us as racist because of our insistence of using the word "Yuon", then it is our duty to change that perception. We cannot just explain away our right of using the word "Yuon" because it has been in our vocabulary for thousands of years. For thousands of years Cambodians speak only Khmer and did not speak French or English. "Yuon" and "Chen" were the only words known to us to describe the Vietnamese and Chinese, respectively. It was then natural to call the Vietnamese "Yuon" and the Chinese "Chen" because there were no other substitutes for these words. Now that we are living in a modern era where everybody communicates in French or English, we are therefore exposed to the new international vocabularies to describe the people of Vietnamese’s and China’s descents. Why can’t we adapt and accept the change? Why do we stubbornly cling to our old way of justifying that we are right and everybody else is wrong? We may be right but our attitude of intransigence give the perception to Westerners that we are arrogant and racist. What is the harm of replacing the word "Yuon" and "Chen" to describe the Vietnamese (or Vietnamien) and Chinese (or Chinois) when we write in English or French?

Reason #6
There is no way we can win the battle of ideas in this one. We are losing the public relation’s war and there is no way we can convince enough Westerners we are right on this issue. I, myself, consider the usage of the word "Yuon" and "Chen" when writing in French or English to be awkward and somewhat pejorative. However, I still believe it is acceptable to use those words when we speak or write in Khmer. It is much harder for me to say "Choun Cheat Vietnam" or "Choun Cheat Chen" than to say "Yuon." Or "Chen" in Khmer.

Conclusion
I personally feel it is in the best interest for us to stop using the words "Yuon" and "Chen" to describe the Vietnamese or Chinese when speaking or writing in French or English. There is nothing for us to gain for using those words. There are too much time and energy wasting on this subject that could have been better served helping the country. We are not living in the 10th century where we have no other options to describe the Vietnamese or Chinese. During that time we spoke only Khmer. Now that we are living in the 21st century and are being exposed to the rest of the world where the communication is conducted mostly in English, it is therefore incumbent upon us to learn and adapt to our new environment. There are internationally recognizable and acceptable words to describe people of Vietnamese’s or Chinese’s descents. We must use those words to communicate in French or English because it is not only the right thing to do but it is also beneficial for us. We are not living in an isolated environment but rather in an era of globalization. We cannot afford the rest of the world to portray us as intransigence and racist. We are the victim of our own intransigence because we refuse to change and allow other people to define us instead. We have to make our image of who we are. We cannot make ourselves be the victim of the whole Khmer-Vietnamese affairs by allowing others to define us as racist and spending our time to defend ourselves. If we remove the racism sticker by stopping the usage of the word "Yuon" at least in the written communication part of it, then many problems will be solved by themselves. More time can be focused on the real problems that exist between Cambodia and Vietnam.

Whenever I need to find solutions to some problems or try to improve on certain situations in life, I always go back to the story told in "La Fable de La Fontaine." There are so many favorite stories, but the one that I like the best and is very relevant to almost every situation is the story of "Le Chêne et le Roseau." The story tells of a strong oak tree (Chêne) falling down and being uprooted while the reed (Roseau) still remaining standing and alive after a strong wind. Vietnam is a powerful country like the wind and if Cambodia wants to survive we cannot be like a strong oak tree but rather like a supple reed. There is an old Khmer saying, "Kom Yauk Komheung Tol Neung Komhol."

Kenneth So's letter to the Washigton Time
September 20, 2002

Dear Sir:

I am writing this letter in response to your Washington Times article of Dr. David Roberts (Lecturer from the School of History and International Affairs, University of Ulster, Northern Ireland) dated 09/13/02, who accused the Cambodian opposition leader Sam Rainsy as undemocratic and authoritarian. In addition, he implied that Mr. Sam Rainsy was a racist, when he used the word "Youn" to refer to the Vietnamese.

First, the Cambodian opposition leader Sam Rainsy is a true patriot and democrat. He is well deserving of the award that was given to him by Senator John McCain.

Dr. Roberts may be an expert in his field but he is no expert in Khmer language. In the Khmer dictionary, it says "Youn" means Vietnamese and is possibly related to the Sanskrit word "Yavana" that means savage. However, this possibility of a link between the words "Youn" and "Yavana" is just pure speculation and has no basis for it.

Anyhow, my own research indicates that the word "Youn" came from the word "Yueh". The Mandarin Chinese calls Vietnam, Yueh Nam. The word "Nam" means south in Chinese. "Yueh" indicates the name of the people of that region. Therefore, "Yueh" means Viet or Vietnamese in Chinese and "Yueh Nam" means the "Yueh" people of the south. In this case, south means south of China. The North pronounces it Yeknam (with a "Y" sound).

Chou Ta-Kuan (Zhou Daguan), the celebrated Chinese Ambassador to Cambodia in the 13th century, indicated in his report that there was already a large population of Chinese settling in Cambodia at that time. He said that the Chinese preferred life in the Khmer Empire because it was easier than in China. There were a lot of Chinese men marrying the native Cambodian women. I don't know when Khmer started to call the Vietnamese "Youn", but the habit may have been picked up from the Chinese settlers who lived in Cambodia at the time. The word "Youn" may have derived from the Chinese word "Yueh" to indicate the Vietnamese. If one starts to think about it, "Viet" (as pronounced by the North Vietnamese) or "Yeak" (as pronounced by the South Vietnamese) sounds very similar to "Yueh"; and "Yueh", meaning Vietnamese, in turn sounds very similar to "Youn". George Coedes, the French expert on the Southeast Asian classical study, found an earlier evidence of the word "Yuon" inscribed in Khmer on a stele dating to the time of the Khmer King Suryavarman I (1002-1050.)

Why do the so-called Western scholars and journalists keep on perpetrating this kind of misinformation about the word "Yuon"? "Youn" does not mean savage as Dr. Roberts had mistakenly indicated in his writing. Savage in Cambodian means "Pourk Prey" or "Phnong". Cambodians calls Vietnamese "Youn" the same way they call Indian "Khleung", Burmese "Phoumea", Chinese "Chen", and French "Barang".

When the Vietnamese calls Cambodian "Mien" why did the Western press and scholars not report it to be a derogatory word also? If I were to follow the logical thinking of the Western press and scholars, then "Mien" must be a derogatory word also. In the late 17th century, the Vietnamese court of Hue had indiscriminately changed the names of the Cambodian princesses Ang Mei, Ang Pen, Ang Peou, and Ang Snguon to the Vietnamese sounding names of Ngoc-van, Ngoc-bien, Ngoc-tu, and Ngoc-nguyen, respectively. Also they changed the name of Phnom Penh to Nam Vang. Why do scholars and press stay silent on these
subjects.

It is very dangerous for foreigners, like Dr. Roberts, to interpret the meaning of certain native words when they do not fully understand the languages and customs of those natives. It is people like Dr. Roberts who helps perpetrate the misinterpretation and misunderstanding of the word "Youn" to mean savage. aggravate the mistrust and hate between Cambodian and Vietnamese.

Cambodians have been using the word "Youn" to refer to the Vietnameses before the word Vietnamese had even existed. Because of the ignorance of some scholars and journalists about the meaning of this word, are we therefore supposed to abandon using this word that we have done from time immemorial?

If Dr. Roberts insists on saying that the word "Youn" means savage, then I would ask him to prove to Cambodians how it is so. How does he know that this word means savage? What did he base his knowledge from? If he is a true scholar, then he must not base his understanding on hearsay. Otherwise, his credibility is at risk.


Sincerely,
Kenneth T. So

Trudy's Jacobsen's letter to the Phnom Penh Post in response to the rebuttal provided by Ambassador Truong Mealy and Touch Bora, Esq.


Phnom Penh Post, Issue 15 / 10, May 19 - June 1, 2006

Kampuchea Krom: the friction after the facts

Bora Touch's very detailed critique (Post, April 21, 2006) of my article Kampuchea Krom: The Facts Behind the Friction (Post, March 10) was a welcome change from the vitriolic emails I have been receiving since I first published the piece in March, if indicative that he has too much time on his hands, and too much faith in unsourced revisionist history.

The hatred and irrationality in the personal attacks levelled at me in the past two months have shocked me deeply. I have been accused of being a "red brain container," that I am "in the pay of Hanoi," that due to "marriage problems" I hate the Khmer and seek revenge, and various other charming statements involving my relationship to the "yuon masters," some of which seem anatomically impossible.

More disturbing have been the letters saying "It is easy to shoot down stupid academics" and variations thereof, and the attempt by a group of Cambodians living in Australia to seek an injunction against any future publication of my opinion on Kampuchea Krom, Cambodian-Vietnamese bilateral relations, and the word "yuon."

It is amazing that people can be so selective in the application of the principle of free speech. When Sam Rainsy is threatened for his views, there cannot be enough of it; when a simple academic delves into the Cambodian past and explodes a myth that has perpetuated hatred between two neighbouring peoples, suddenly free speech seems less palatable.

This level of negativity in response to a column that was meant to inform people of events they otherwise may not have known of, based upon Cambodian primary sources, is beyond comprehension.

I am grateful to those who have written thanking me for the 'Lost in Time' series, particularly the many Cambodian students I have taught over the years. They may not agree with everything I say, but they articulate their disagreement without resorting to cheap shots and attacks upon my character.

The older generation is mired in a tradition of Cambodian scholarship in which the veracity of one's work is directly associated with status. Thus appending an ex-ambassador's name to a letter is seen as increasing its veracity. Thus questioning the prestige of the university from which I obtained my PhD, continually reiterating the fact that I am female and therefore prone to emotional, nonsensical outbursts, and pointing out that I am a foreigner diminish my status, in the eyes of those trapped in a social, political and methodological time warp.

Yes, I am a foreigner. However, having spent 18 years living and working in and on Cambodia, I have a fairly good understanding of Cambodian culture and society today.

I would not presume to compare myself to a Cambodian (even those who jet in from Auckland or Long Beach every few years dispersing largesse to their extended families and enjoying the elevated status that being overseas Khmer brings) in terms of cultural comprehension, but the merit in being a foreigner, albeit with extensive experience in Cambodia, is my objectivity. The adverse reactions to my article are subjective, even biased, and hold no weight.

I stand by my assertion that the word "yuon" is pejorative in Cambodian society today. I am not disputing that technically "yuon" is an ethnic appellation. It is the way that the word is used that is pejorative. People who protest that "yuon" is a harmless term of ethnicity are using the same arguments that whites in the US had for the word "Negro." What matters is how the person on the receiving end of the word interprets it and the intent of the person using it. The letters I have received refer continually to the "yuon masters," "the stinking yuon," and how the "yuon enemy" are even now seeking to take over Cambodia through their puppets in the Cambodian government. These are hardly positive epithets.

This episode has at least dispelled my naïve conviction that if Cambodians knew what their own records said about the two events constantly held up as evidence of a historical tradition of Vietnamese aggression prior to the 20th century, perhaps they would rethink their hatred of Vietnamese living in Cambodia and be less inclined to turn a blind eye when Vietnamese fishing villages are massacred; that perhaps they would be less suspicious of the motives of the Vietnamese government when treaties between the two countries are signed, and see such events as two countries moving forward into a shared future of goodwill and cooperation; that perhaps those who feel alienated from Cambodia after many years of living elsewhere will stop perpetuating this hatred in a frantic attempt to have an impact upon Cambodian politics, however tangentially.

And perhaps kouprey will fly.
Trudy Jacobsen
Phnom Penh

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Thursday, June 07, 2007

Cambodia: Can't See the Forest for the Thieves

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The author, with Global Witness in November 2005, investigating a truck transporting
logs to Phnom Penh. The driver of this truck claimed he was carrying "mango trees"
(Global Witness photo).

Liam Cochrane | Bio | 06 Jun 2007
World Politics Review Exclusive

The latest report by illegal logging watchdog Global Witness has received the highest accolade an investigative NGO's work can receive from the Cambodian Government: It has been banned. The reason? It exposes the country's largest illegal logging syndicate and its links to senior government officials, including the prime minister. Plus, it details the way the army has been used as a log courier service for the secret trade with Vietnam and China. Now, as Cambodia's annual pledge-a-thon approaches, international donors are scrambling to react to accusations they haven't done enough to protect Cambodia's forests. Global Witness, the U.K.-based logging and blood diamond watchdog, cheekily titled its 95-page report "Cambodia's Family Trees" and printed a cover with framed pictures of Prime Minister Hun Sen -- and the logging kingpins related to him by marriage or political ties -- hanging from a barren tree.


The study took Global Witness three years of surveillance and interviews to complete and is perhaps the most extensive exposé of institutionalized corruption and natural resources pillaging to date. Among the main targets are Hun Sen's first cousin, Hun Chouch, Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Chan Sarun, and Forestry Administration boss Ty Sokhun. So it was little surprise the report ruffled some feathers. "If they [Global Witness] come to Cambodia, I will hit them until their heads are broken," was how the prime ,inister's brother and provincial governor, Hun Neng, responded to accusations that he and his wife were involved in the illicit trade.


Cambodia's Ministry of Information released a statement describing the report as "a personal accusation . . . to cause political conflicts in the country" and ordered the confiscation of any copies already in the Southeast Asian nation. But the fallout adheres to a long-running pattern of government behavior that is accurately predicted within the report.

"Hun Sen responds to even muted criticism by declaring that attempts to remove him will cause the country to fall back into conflict and instability," Global Witness wrote about the leader of a country still traumatized by the killing frenzy of the Khmer Rouge in the 1970s and the bitter civil war that followed. It's not the first time Global Witness has raised the ire of Cambodia's government. Global Witness was appointed by the government as the official monitor of illegal logging, but was fired from the job after its reports uncovered the involvement of military and political figures.

In 2004, copies of the group's report "Taking a Cut" were confiscated at the airport and several international staff were refused entry. Global Witness says the issues of illegal logging and political power are intertwined, with logging bankrolling Hun Sen's private armies, which in turn assure political supremacy for the one-eyed former Khmer Rouge leader, nicknamed the "Strongman."

Log Laundering

Cambodia's ruling powers have long used timber to fund their wars and, in more recent times, their political dominance. In the late 1990s, there was pressure from international donors to crack down on the plunder; the transport of logs was banned and illegal cutting slowed. But lucrative profits and lax laws meant that the chainsaws never really stopped. Over the years there have many creative schemes invented to bypass logging regulations.

The funniest involved logging permits given ostensibly for the purpose of building a platform so the country's parachute regiment could practice jumping off. The most shameless would have to be the tricking of monks into signing documents requesting valuable koki logs for building dragon boats to represent their temples in the annual boat racing festival.

The latest Global Witness report focuses on the use of economic land concessions -- usually plantations -- as a cover for illegal logging. In 2001, Hun Sen inaugurated the Tumring Rubber Plantation and the country's biggest logging cartel went to work.

The Seng Keang Import Export company was owned by Hun Sen's Rolex-wearing cousin Hun Chouch, his ex-wife Seng Keangg and Khun Thong, brother-in-law of the minister of forestry, the official ultimately responsible for protecting Cambodia's trees. Their "plantation" area was located inside the Prey Long forest -- the largest lowland evergreen forest still standing in Southeast Asia.

It is home to elephants, tigers and the Asiatic black bear, as well as burial grounds and resin trees tapped by locals for a modest income. But Prey Long's natural blessings are also its curse: The rich flora includes large amounts of commercial-grade and luxury timber. "It is unlikely they could have selected a more suitable location for their activities and Tumring duly became the center of the largest illegal logging operation in Cambodia," said Global Witness. The strategy was simple: harvest the most valuable trees within reach, move the timber inside the plantation's borders and claim it was felled in clearing. This neatly avoided various laws and a ban on the transport of freshly cut logs. The operation was big.

In 2005, community forestry activists counted 131 chainsaws and 12 mobile sawmills in the district. Timber was processed at an illegal sawmill at the appropriately named village of Khaos, or trucked out at night to another factory in the capital of Phnom Penh, most of it eventually heading for China. Between 2003 and 2005, China says it bought $16.2 million worth of plywood from Cambodia, with Seng Keang being the principle manufacturer of ply. Strangely, Cambodia's registered exports, and thus taxes, for that period were zero.

In November 2005, I accompanied Global Witness to Tumring and saw work gangs with chainsaws kilometers outside the plantation boundaries. They told us their boss, a notorious local thug known by his radio call sign "Mr. 95", paid $100 a month to the Forestry Administration in Khaos for each chainsaw in use; just the tip of the corruption iceberg. After dark we followed convoys of trucks heading to Phnom Penh. We reached some that had stopped by the side of the road and we got out to inspect. The owner of the truck told Global Witness the trucks contained "mango trees." I peeked inside and saw neatly cut logs a foot in diameter.

As we talked with the nervous driver, a pickup truck full of armed soldiers escorting the convoy tried to photograph us as they sped past, a dangerous prospect considering the death threats and beatings given out to Global Witness staff in the past. As Global Witness explains in their report, the complicity of corrupt police makes this racket possible, but for the military it's much more -- the profits from transporting illegally cut logs fund a small army, which in turn props up Cambodia's authoritarian rulers.

How to Fund a Private Army

Since an attempted coup against Hun Sen in 1994, Southeast Asia's longest serving premier has maintained an elite Bodyguard Unit of 4,000 well-equipped troops loyal solely to him. In addition, Hun Sen has a backup force of 2,000 soldiers, known as Brigade 70.

Global Witness says that under the leadership of business-turned-soldier Brigadier General Hak Mao, Brigade 70 has developed a lucrative business transporting logs and other contraband across the country. Hak Mao personally owns 16 trucks and has two depots in the capital -- one for commercial grade timber, one for luxury wood, according to Global Witness.

"According to one timber dealer in Phnom Penh, Hak Mao is able to deliver logs of all types according to order," says the report.

The U.K. watchdog estimates that fees from transporting logs and other smuggled goods such as liquor, cigarettes and even ice cream -- amounts to somewhere between $2 million and $2.75 million a year. A cut of this money -- at least $30,000 a month, says Global Witness -- is used to fund Brigade 70 and the Bodyguard Unit. "The Brigade 70 case highlights the direct linkage between Hun Sen's build up of loyalist military units and large-scale organized crime," says the Global Witness report, which was released from the safety of Bangkok on June 1.

Where's the Outrage?

The reaction from the international community has been muted. The U.S. and British embassies have said they share some of the concerns Global Witness has raised, but have not been drawn into the detail of the report. Some of Global Witness' strongest criticisms are directed towards the international donors who last year spent $601 million underwriting half the Cambodian budget, yet apply little real pressure for change.

"The donors have failed. They are basically spineless," Simon Taylor, director of Global Witness, told the Associated Press. "The message that Hun Sen gets from the donors is that they don't really give a damn." Hun Sen, however, does give a damn.

Despite receiving "no-strings-attached" aid money from the Chinese equal to all other donor contributions combined, Cambodia continues to seek the legitimacy that can only come from the support of developed nations.

And despite well-documented corruption and an increasingly one-party state, the international community -- much to the frustration of many NGOs on the ground -- continues to give the Cambodian Government that support. Cambodia's army -- the same force that transports illegal logs -- is receiving military assistance from Australia, China, Vietnam, and the United States.

The U.S. suspended military assistance after the 1997 coup, in which Hun Sen violently unseated his co-Prime Minister Prince Ranariddh. But after Cambodia recently signed the "Article 19" agreement, which promises not to send any U.S. citizens to the International Criminal Court, and began helping out with the "War on Terror" by some dubious arrests of Muslims, the United States is once again providing aid for Cambodia's soldiers.

Ironically, the U.S. embassy says a third of the $1 million military assistance that was earmarked for 2006 went towards trucks, spare parts and training. What makes Global Witness' report on forestry all the more compelling is Cambodia's burgeoning oil industry. Several companies -- including Chevron -- are currently exploring oil fields of considerable size just off the southern coastline.

But many see the sad fate of the forestry industry as a likely precedent for what will happen to the oil bonanza: The ruling elite and their cronies will get richer, the environment will be devastated and the people of Cambodia will receive next to nothing. It's the so called "oil curse" that has afflicted Angola, Chad and Nigeria, among others. To sound a warning to Cambodia's "kleptocracy," Global Witness has recommended international donors link non-humanitarian aid money to reforms and "test cases" to make an example of the powerful.

"There can be little doubt that a handful of competently investigated and prosecuted cases against senior officials, their relatives and associates would have a far greater impact on abuse of power and corruption than new legislation, as important as it is," said the report. The donor community will have to think fast.

The annual meeting at which bilateral donors and the World Bank will pledge next year's aid and discuss the development of the nation is scheduled for June 19-20. No doubt, the issues of illegal logging, corruption and misuse of the military will be somewhere on the agenda. The question is where do they go from there?

Liam Cochrane is a freelance journalist based in Katmandu, Nepal. He was formerly the managing editor of the Phnom Penh Post newspaper in Cambodia.

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Friday, April 20, 2007

Vietnam and Cambodian Communism

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Communist Vietnamese-Lao-Khmer meeting (Photo: KR Trial Web Portal)


Stephen J. MORRIS in Public Forum on Khmer Rouge History From
stalin to Pol Pot-Towards a Description of
the khmer Rouge Regime 25-26 january 2007 Sunway Hotel,
Phnom Penh (Picture by: Prim Pilot)



By Stephen J. Morris
Source: The Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association
Posted at Khmer Rouge Trial Web Portal

INTRODUCTION
In the official mythology of the Khmers Rouges, their military victory in 1975, and the maintenance of their rule over Cambodia from 1975 until 1978 (the rule of Angka Padevat in the state of Democratic Kampuchea), was portrayed as a result of the efforts of Cambodians alone. This is the most ridiculous fantasy. Without the support of the Vietnamese and Chinese communists the regime known as Democratic Kampuchea would never have existed. Moreover, the leading Cambodian communists were deeply enmeshed in the activities of the communist world for most of their lives.

I will show how Vietnam played a vital role in the rise of the Khmers Rouges to power, and how the Vietnamese communist leaders were happy to let the Khmers Rouges do as they wished in power, so long as the regime created - Democratic Kampuchea - did not threaten or embarrass Vietnam. However the irrational belligerence of Pol Pot and his entourage in foreign policy soon became a source of concern for Hanoi, and Democratic Kampuchea's violent behaviour towards its more powerful neighbour pushed Vietnam towards a policy of armed retaliation, invasion and occupation.

VIETNAM AND THE RISE OF CAMBODIAN COMMUNISM
The Vietnamese communists were deeply involved in the inception and formation of the Cambodian communist movement. In 1930 the agent of the Communist International (Comintem) known as Nguyen Ai Quoc -- who in 1943 changed his alias to Ho Chi Minh -- founded the Vietnamese Communist Party at a meeting held in the British colony of Hong Kong. But after filing the founding documents with his employers in Moscow, Quoc was instructed by the Comintem to change the name of the party to the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP). The Comintem argued that "Not only does Indochina have a geographic, economic and political unity, but above all we have a need for unity of struggle, for a unique direction of all of the Indochinese proletariat opposed to all the forces of reaction in Indochina, to the policy of division of French imperialism." The Comintern's intention was clear: Emancipation of the three different nations of French Indochina was to be carried out not by the independent efforts of each of the three peoples, but rather under Vietnamese Communist tutelage.

As it happened there were no revolutionary movements in Cambodia at this time. And of the 211 founding members of the Indochinese Communist Party, not a single one was from Cambodia or Laos. One finds in the Comintem archives in Moscow, Quoc's actual correspondence about this with his leaders. In September 1930 Nguyen Ai Quoc claimed to have an ICP party membership of 124, of which 120 were Chinese and 4 were Annamites [Vietnamese]. The Party controlled labor union consisted of 300 ethnic Chinese. The French suppressed the communist structures throughout Indochina in 1935, and by March 1935 there were only 9 communists in all of Cambodia. But the ethnic situation in Cambodia remained much the same throughout the 1930s. In 1938 the Cambodian branch of the ICP had a mere 16 members, all of them ethnic Chinese.

After World War II the Vietnamese communists, operating through their front organization popularly known as the Viet Minh, began their offensive against the French colonialists. However they sought to rely heavily upon ethnic Vietnamese for their efforts. Two of the most important Viet Minh leaders during the 1940s were Sieu Heng and Son Ngoc Minh, both of mixed Vietnamese and Khmer ancestry. Armed units of the Viet Minh were stationed in Battambang, where all the units were ethnic Vietnamese, and in southeast Cambodia, where again ethnic Vietnamese were predominant in the revolutionary committees.

In March 1950, at a meeting of Viet Minh and Khmer Issarak leaders held in Ha Tien, Vietnam, Nguyen Than Son, head of the Viet Minh's committee for foreign affairs in southern Vietnam, spoke of the Vietnamese emigre population in Cambodia as a "driving force destined to set off the Revolutionary Movement in Cambodia." Later he seemed to be complaining when he stated that the ICP, which controlled the Cambodian Movement, was composed of mostly Vietnamese and "did not have deep roots among the Khmer people."

In 1951 the underground ICP resurfaced as the Vietnam Workers Party, and simultaneously announced the emergence of two "fraternal" parties for Laos and Cambodia. The latter was called the Revolutionary Cambodian People's Party. According to Bernard Fall the statutes of the Cambodian party had to be translated from Vietnamese into Cambodian, and ethnic Vietnamese dominated the leadership of the party. Over the next three years the Vietnamese tried to recruit ethnic Cambodians into the political and military structures of the party, but with limited success. For example, according to a French intelligence document of 1952, the Phnom Penh cell secretariat had a membership of 34, of whom 27 were Vietnamese, 3 were Chinese, and only four were Cambodians.

In November 1953 Cambodia under the royal government of Sihanouk was given complete independence by the French. After the signing of the Geneva Agreements in 1954, the Viet Minh Sees retreated from Cambodia, taking with them half of the cadres of the Revolutionary Cambodian Party. These cadres were to be given further training in Hanoi, and kept in reserve until history provided an opportune moment for their return.

During this period of the mid 1950s there was influx of younger communists back to Cambodia from a period of study France. Most notable of this group was Pol Pot (then known as Saloth Sar, Jeng Sary, Khieu Samohan, Hou Youn and Hu Nim. Some of these communists had come into contact with the ideas of Marx and Lenin before, they went to France. But they had all developed their communist ideology in France under the influence of the Stalinist French communist party. Some of them, like Pol Pot had fought in the last stages of the Viet Minh war against the French. But we should not make too much of the French experience of Pol Pot and long Sary. because other important members of the future Khmer Rouge inner circle -- notably Nuon Chea and Ta Mok -- never went to France. More important to note is that none of the younger communists exhibited any anti-Vietnamese sentiment at this time.

The returnees from France were able to seize control of the Cambodian communist movement by the ena of the 1950s Yet in 1960 the party's name was changed to Kampuchean Workers Party, to conform with the Vietnamese name, and in 1966 it was changed again to Kampuchean Communist Party In 1963 Pol Pot became secretary general of the party. Throughout the 1960s the Kampuchean communists remained friendly and deferential towards the Vietnamese. In July 1965 Pol Pot traveled to Hanoi and discussed with the Vietnamese politburo the appropriate policy for Cambodia.

It is not exactly clear when the Cambodian communists developed their attachment to Maoism. The imbibing of Maoist ideology by the Khmer Rouge seems to have been quite gradual. And the Vietnamese communists themselves must have played some direct role in assisting that process since they themselves had been under Chinese communist influence during the years 1950-56 and 1963-64, years when Vietnamese communist influence over Cambodian communists was still significant. Pol Pot made his first trip to China in late 1965 and stayed into 1966. This was the beginning o the Maoist terror and ideological campaign known as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Pol Pot visited China again in 1970. Pol Pot's visits to China probably did not initiate, but most likely intensified, Maoist ideological influence upon the Khmer Rouge.

In January 1968 the Kampuchean Communist Party initiated an armed uprising against the royal government of Prince Sihanouk. This would seem to have been in contradiction with the Vietnamese communist policy of recognizing the royal Cambodian government, a government which had allowed the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong to use eastern Cambodia as a sanctuary and supply line in their war against the American-backed anticommunist government of South Vietnam. However this Khmers Rouges uprising was mostly confined to the hill dwellers (Khmer Loeu) of the mountainous of northeast Cambodia - Ratanakiri and Mondolkiri - and it did not pose any real threat to he survival of the government of Prince Sihanouk. Hence it did not really threaten the strategy of the North Vietnamese.

During the late 1960s many Cambodians, especially among the Cambodian political and military elites became unhappy with the Vietnamese communist occupation of Cambodian soil. They preferred Cambodia to have a closer relationship with the United States. Sihaniouk slowly and reluctantly changed his policy in this regard, and in 1970 he traveled to China and the Soviet Union to try and persuade the big communist powers to pressure Hanoi to remove its forces from Cambodia, Sihanouk was not successful, and on March 18, 1970, while Sihanouk was still in Moscow, Lon Nol led a bloodless palace coup d'etat. This totally changed Cambodia's situation.

Manv people think that the coup d'etat led by Lon Nol, was the work of the United States and its Central Intelligence Agency (ClA). At the time Hanoi, Beijing and Moscow, and their western friends with the help of Sihanouk, did everything to try to spread that myth. There is absolutely no evidence of that. No evidence has been found even by the most critical western writer, William Shawcross. Of course the Americans welcomed the coup.

Many people also think that it was the US and South Vietnamese invasion of eastern Cambodia on April 30, 1970, that brought Cambodia into the Vietnam war. That is also plainly false. It was me Vietnamese communists who spread the Vietnam war inside Cambodia. One of Lon Nol's first public proclamations was to demand that the Vietnamese communist forces leave Cambodia within 48 hours. They ignored his demand, and at the end of March 1970 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces moved out of their border sanctuaries and began to attack the armed forces and towns of the newly proclaimed Khmer Republic. At the same time approximately one thousand of the Khmer Viet Minh, who had been trained in Hanoi, were reinfiltrated back into Cambodia. Their task was to help supervise the areas that would be captured by the Vietnamese communist armies.

On April 30, 1970, exactly six weeks after the Lon Nol coup, and four weeks after the North Vietnamese began their attacks on the Khmer Republic, troops of the United States and South Vietnam began a major attack on the communist sanctuaries inside Cambodia. The Vietnamese communists, anticipating the attack, fled in advance of the allied sweep. However public protests and congressional opposition within the United States precluded the extended American military operations inside Cambodia that any successful pursuit of the communist armies would have required.

When American forces withdrew from the border areas after only two months inside Cambodia, they had successfully cleared most of the base areas that threatened the Mekong Delta region of South Vietnam. But they had hardly diminished the communist manpower available inside Cambodia as a whole. In the first four months of fighting the Vietnamese communists had seized control of half the territory of Cambodia, In spite of continued American bombing attacks upon them, North Vietnam's battle hardened veterans remained in a good position to deal with the highly motivated but poorly trained and equipped army of the Khmer Republic.

For the next two years of the struggle for Cambodia, it would be Hanoi that would determine the outcome of military events. By the end of 1970 there were four North Vietnamese combat divisions in Cambodia, with some ten thousand of these troops targeting the republican army, and others protecting the Ho Chi Minh Trail supply line to the South Vietnam battlefield.

At the beginning of the war it was obvious to both the Vietnamese communist leaders and Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge that the latter were not yet strong enough to seize Phnom Penh on their own. If Cambodia was to have a communist government, then the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong armies would have to play a role. The Hanoi leaders made explicit in their secret meetings that their party's policy was to "strengthen the revolutionary base in Cambodia and lead the country along the path to socialism." And despite their dismay with the general capabilities of the Cambodian insurgency the Vietnamese were optimistic about the prospects of a communist victory in Cambodia. As one captured communist document summarized the Hanoi view: "The Cambodian revolution is entering a new phase ... From a vacillating neutralist regime, Cambodia can now follow a steady policy. When the enemy is defeated, she will become a democratic and independent country and proceed toward socialism."

Between April 1970 and March 1972 it was the battle hardened Vietnamese army which crushed most of the best units of the army of the Khmer Republic. During this period Vietnamese and Cambodian communist forces, after seizing control of an area, set up a political administration controlled by the National United Front (FUNK) and nominally under the authority of Prince Sihanouk's Royal Government (GRUNK) which was based in exile in Beijing. There were three elements in the political coalition opposed to the Khmer Republic. First, the Khmer Viet Minh communists, trained in Hanoi since 1954, and backed by Vietnamese communist army units. Second, the Pol Pot led Khmers Rouges guerrillas. Third, the followers of Prince Sihanouk, who were militarily weak.

FUNK propaganda appeals emphasizing Sihanouk's leadership role in the insurgency were important in the first year of the war, and reflected the influence of the North Vietnamese upon Cambodian insurgent propaganda. It undoubtedly helped the communists to recruit Cambodian peasant support. However sometime in the middle of 1971, as Pol Pot's Khmers Rouges leaders began to consolidate their control within FUNK, they began the process of removing the pro-Sihanouk elements from positions of power in insurgent-controlled areas. Two years later the Khmers Rouges began an intensive propaganda campaign to discredit the Prince in the eyes of the Cambodian peasants.

The Hanoi-trained communists never attained leadership positions within the Cambodian Revolutionary Organization itself. All the top military and political position within FUNK were held by the Pol Pot forces, who identified themselves as members of Angka Padevat (Revolutionary Organization). During 1970 and 1971, in some areas under Vietnamese military control Khmer Viet Minh political cadres held positions of local state power from the village to the tambon (sector) level. As for the Khmer Viet Minh military cadres, upon their return to Cambodia they were given low ranking positions within the insurgency. Eventually they, together with the political cadres, would be liquidated by Pol Pot's security forces.

By late 1971 the Pol Pot leadership of the KCP had become frustrated with Vietnamese attempts to control the insurgency. They decided to try to expel the Vietnamese communists from Cambodia, even though the Khmer Republic was at that time not yet defeated. Fighting broke out between the Pol Pot led guerillas and some Vietnamese units in late 1971 and especially in 1972.

However it was not the actions of Pol Pot's forces, but rather events pertaining to the struggle for South Vietnam, especially the launching of the Easter Offensive in March 1972, that led Hanoi to remove the bulk of its combat forces from Cambodia. The terrible losses suffered by Hanoi in that offensive, and the signing of the Paris Peace Agreements in January 1973, meant that Hanoi could no longer afford to be deeply involved in the struggle for control of Cambodia thereafter. Yet they did allow Chinese military supplies through to the Khmers Rouges until the war ended.

The Hanoi leaders had already laid the foundation for a Khmers Rouges victory. During the two years from March 1970 the North Vietnamese army had severely mauled the army of the Khmer Republic, and Hanoi sponsored cadres had recruited thousands of peasants under the deceptive banner of the politically impotent Sihanouk. Hanoi's actions by themselves did not determine the outcome of the war. But they greatly helped place Pol Pot's forces in a position to seize power in April 1975.

VIETNAM AND DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA
When Phnom Penh surrendered to insurgent forces on April 30, 1975, the Khmers Rouges victors were enthusiastically congratulated by the Vietnamese communists. By the time the North Vietnamese army had marched into Saigon some two weeks later, Phnom Penh and most of the major towns of Cambodia had been emptied of their former inhabitants. Cambodia, now renamed Democratic Kampuchea, had begun its long march towards the hyper Maoist Utopia. But in spite of real differences between the Vietnamese and Cambodian approaches to revolution, there were few public signs of Vietnamese communist dissatisfaction with their neighbour's social experiment.. However, concealed from international view, the tensions that had surfaced during the war years had been exacerbated. The ostensible issue of the dispute was the border between Vietnam and Cambodia.

Between 1870 and 1914 the French had redrawn the borders between Cambodia and Vietnam, by amputating large chunks of Cambodian territory and making them administratively part of their Vietnamese colonial entities. In June 1948, in the Along Bay Agreement, the French recognised their colony of Cochinchina -what had formerly been southern Cambodia (Kampuchea Krom to the Khmers Rouges) - as part of Vietnam. The resentment felt by most Cambodians at this humiliation, combined with the spirit of triumphalism that permeated the Khmers Rouges, fed into an amition for forceful recovery of lost territories. Sihanouk reports that in 1975 the Khmers Rouge had told him "we are going to recover Kampuchea Krom." Yet such ambition of the Khmers Rouges should have been restrained by military realities. The Vietnamese army was ten times the size of the Khmers Rouges army. Vietnam also had a significant air force and navy, which the DK did not.

Nevertheless in early May 1975 the Khmers Rouges attacked Vietnamese islands in the Gulf of Thailand, claiming the islands that the French had assigned to their Vietnamese colony, and which had been inherited by South Vietnam. The Vietnamese, though surprised, responded decisively. By the end of May the Vietnamese had recaptured the islands by force, taking 300 prisoners. In early In early June the Vietnamese retaliated further by attacking and occupying the Cambodian island of Puolo Wai. These actions seemed to restrain for a time the Khmers Rouges enthusiasm for military challenges to Vietnam.

On June 2 Pol Pot received Nguyen Van Linh, who was representing the Vietnamese Workers Party (as the Vietnamese communist party was still called). Pol Pot told Linh that the fighting had been due to "ignorance of the local geography by Kampuchean troops." In June 1975 Pol Pot, leng Sary and Nuon Chea led a KCP delegation that secretly travelled to Hanoi for negotiations. In July 1975 a high powered delegation from Vietnam, headed by Communist Party first secretary Le Duan, undertook what was described as a "friendly visit" to Cambodia. In August the Cambodian island that Vietnam had occupied was returned.

Publicly the Vietnamese gave no hint of any problems. The September issue of the official Vietnamese monthly Vietnamese Courier spoke of the talks being held in a "cordial atmosphere full of brotherly spirit." The article went further when it praised Cambodia's new social order without qualification. "Liberated Cambodia is living in a new and healthy atmosphere."

The Vietnamese had retained some of their military forces on Cambodian soil after the joint communist victories of 1975. It took some political effort by the Chinese to convince the Hanoi leaders that the troops should be returned to Vietnam.

Throughout 1976 there were public greetings exchanged on special occasions. For example in April 1976 the first anniversary of the Khmers Rouges victory was hailed by Vietnamese party and government leaders. The Vietnamese media spoke glowingly of the "achievements" of the "Cambodian workers, peasants, and revolutionary army." Various official delegations from Vietnam visited Cambodia in 1976. In July an agreement was signed to open an air link between Hanoi and Phnom Penh. In September 1976 that air service was begun.

Thus by the end of 1976 the outward signs suggested close relations between the communist parties and governments of Vietnam and Cambodia. Yet these outward signs concealed the real feelings of both parties The Vietnamese leaders hoped that some pro-Vietnamese elements would appear within the leadership of the Kampuchean Communist Party. At the same time the leaders of Democratic Kampuchea were possessed by a seething hatred and fear of the rulers of Vietnam - a hatred and fear that threatened to boil over into armed confrontation.

The Vietnamese leaders had a poor grasp of the real political situation within the leadership of Democratic Kampuchea. They felt that Pol Pot and leng Sary were pro-Chinese and therefore bad people but that Nuon Chea was different. On November 6 1976 Pham Van Dong told the Soviet ambassador to Vietnam that "with Nuon Chea we are able to work better. We know him better than the other leaders of Kampuchea." At a meeting with the Soviet Ambassador on November 16, 1976 The Vietnamese Communist Party first secretary Le Duan stated that he was glad that Pol Pot and leng Sary had (apparently) been removed from the leadership, because they constituted "a pro-Chinese sect conducting a crude and severe policy." Le Duan also asserted that Nuon Chea, a member of the Standing Committee and Secretariat of the Kampuchean Communist Party, who had replaced Pol Pot as Prime Minister of Democratic Kampuchea in September, was a person of pro-Vietnamese orientation. Le Duan added that "he is our man and my personal friend." Le Duan was to repeat this opinion in private conversations with Soviet diplomats over the next two years. .

The Cambodian communists had good reason to fear the ambitions of the Vietnamese communists in the long term. But the question arises as to how imminent a threat to the power of the Khmers Rouges the Vietnamese posed. The Vietnamese had devised a strategy for controlling the communist movements of Laos and Cambodia. A key element had been inflitrating the communist parties of these countries with people that Hanoi had trained and indoctrinated. In the case of Cambodia Hanoi had trained and supported the so-called Khmer Viet Minh, whom it assumed would act as its agents. So the Khmers Rouges leaders did have real enemies in Hanoi. But Pol Pot and his supporters had anticipated the Vietnamese strategy, and had preempted it by arresting all the Khmer Viet Minh soon after they returned from Hanoi with the Vietnamese army in the early 1970s, and again after the victory of 1975. Nevertheless Pol Pot and his inner circle still feared that Soviet or Vietnamese agents might still be hidden within the party. Thus Pol Pot conducted a series of bloody purges of the party, guided in his choice of victims by paranoid fears rather than real evidence of disloyalty or conspiracy. Not only did Pol Pot carry out bloody internal purges to crush what he thought were enemies within. He also directed the regime's violence against its neighbours.

In April 1977, on the second anniversary of the "liberation" of Phnom Penh, the government and government controlled media in Hanoi offered their congratulations and praise for the Democratic Kampuchea regime. But this goodwill gesture reaped no beneficial consequences for Vietnam. The Khmers Rouges chose the second anniversary of the communist conquest of South Vietnam to leave a bloody message to their former "elder brothers." On April 30, 1977 DK units attacked several villages and towns in An Giang and Chau Doc provinces of South Vietnam, burning houses and killing hundreds of civilians. The Vietnamese leaders were shocked by this unprovoked attack and could not understand any strategic rationale. Nevertheless they decided upon military retaliation. Throughout 1977 armed clashes occurred between Vietnam and Democratic Kampuchea in the border area. Yet when in September 1977 Pol Pot publicly announced that what had previously been known as the Revolutionary Organisation (Angkar Padevat) was in fact the Kampuchean Communist Party, the Vietnamese Communist Party Central Committee sent a message of congratulations, publicly expressing its joy. Interestingly, this message was sent after hundreds of Vietnamese civilians had been killed in Khmers Rouges raids on September 24.

In a conversation with the Soviet ambassador in Hanoi in November 1977 Le Duan indicated that he thought that the anti-Vietnamese behaviour of the DK leaders was because of the outlooks of the “Troskyist” Pol Pot and the “fierce nationalist and pro-Chinese” Ieng Sary. But Le Duan thought that Nuon Chea and Son Sen “have a positive attitude towards Vietnam.” Apparently Le Duan and the other Vietnamese leaders were hoping that the foreign policies of Democratic Kampuchea could be changed by a coup within the Khmers Rouges leadership circles.

In December 1977 the fighting between Vietnam and Democratic Kampuchea escalated. Hanoi used warplanes, artillery and about 20,000 men in an attack inside the Parrot's Beak region of Svay Rieng. After inflicting a serious defeat on the army of Democratic Kampuchea, the Vietnamese withdrew, taking with them thousands of prisoners as well as civilian refugees. They might have been in a position to seize Phnom Penh at that point. But they were concerned about what China’s reaction might be, and hoped that their strong but limited military blows would force the leaders of Democratic Kampuchea to negotiate a settlement. Instead the leaders of DK hardened their attitudes. The DK broke diplomatic regions on December 31, 1977. And they declared the Vietnamese withdrawal a major victory for “the Kampuchean revolution.” Despite their losses, and despite the massive disparity between the Vietnamese and Cambodian armies, with the Vietnamese superiority in both numbers (more than eight one) and quality of military equipment, the army of Democratic Kampuchea persisted in launching attacks inside Vietnamese territory. Phnom Penh radio broadcasts exhorted Cambodians to fight and win total victory over Vietnam, with the deranged assertion that one Kampuchean soldier was equal to thirty Vietnamese. The DK leadership was living in a fantasy world.

Upon realising that the leadership of Democratic Kampuchea was utterly implacable, Hanoi decided upon a new strategy for changing the DK regime. After two and a half years of pretending that Democratic Kampuchea was a nice regime for Cambodians to live under, they began for the first time to denounce the domestic terror of the DK. Between January and June they slowly changed their description of the DK leadership from :the Kampuchean authorities” to the “Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique.” Hanoi radio called for the need to save the Cambodian people from genocide at the hands of the “Pol Pot-leng Sary clique.”

Vietnam began building a “liberation army" from among the refugees and other civilians that they had brought back from Cambodia. Pol Pot also inadvertently helped the Vietnamese to build their army by conducting his internal terror and purges of the party and army. The brutal terror resulted in many cadres and even units of the DK army fleeing for their lives to Vietnam. These defectors, mostly from the Eastern Zone of Democratic Kampuchea, joined the forces being assembled by Vietnam. But The Vetnamese leaders realised that an insurgency based upon the "liberation army" of Cambodians would not be strong enough to prevail. Sometime in the middle of 1978 the Vietnamese leaders decided that they had to launch a full scale invasion of Cambodia, and install a new regime that would not only not be hostile, but also one that would be friendly to Vietnam.

The Soviets were encouraged to increase their military aid to Vietnam, with the pretense that China was threatening Vietnam’s independence. Throughout the latter half of 1978 the Vietnamese prepared their military forces, and the psychological climate of revulsion for the DK regime. They hoped to achieve an easy victory over their former comrades and face few negative consequences.

On December 25 1978 Vietnam launched an all out invasion of Cambodia, As anticipated, resistance to the invasion collapsed quickly. But that invasion, and especially the Vietnamese refusal to withdraw, turned international public opinion and international political leaders strongly against Vietnam. China countered the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia by launching its own invasion of north Vietnam in February 1979. That attack was not in itself a military success for China. But it forced Vietnam to concentrate troops on its northern border and gave ASEAN confidence to be able to provide support for a coalition of Cambodian forces, including the Khmers Rouges, who were resisting Vietnam's occupation.

After more than a decade of Vietnamese military occupation of Cambodia, the pressures from United Nations Chinese American and Southeast Asian nations, and the cut off of Soviet and Eastern European aid, meant that by 1989 the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia had become untenable. The United Nations Secure Council Permanent Five agreed on a plan whereby the UN would undertake a temporary administration of Cambodia, with the purpose of bringing freedom and a just peace to the Cambodian people.

CONCLUSIONS
For approximately sixty years since the formation of the Indochinese Communist Party in 1930, the Vietnamese communists had always considered Cambodia part of an Indochinese Federation of socialist states, under the domination of the more numerous and powerful Vietnamese "elder brothers." The Vietnamese communist strategy was initially to infiltrate the communist movements of the neighbouring countries with ethnic Vietnamese. By the 1950s, the Vietnamese strategy was to infiltrate the Cambodian movement with ethnic Khmer whom Vietnam had trained and indoctrinated. It was certain that those Khmer whom Vietnam had trained would be loyal to Vietnam. This was the first of many misjudgments by the Vietnamese communist leaders. Many of those whom the Vietnamese communists had trained and indoctrinated turned into their enemies.

Nevertheless, based on their misperceptions of the situation, the Vietnamese communists supported the Khmers Rouges revolution. The reasons for the Khmers Rouges coming to power in 1975 were numerous and complex. However we can see from the history of Vietnamese and Cambodian communism that Vietnam played a vital role in laying the foundations for the establishment of Democratic Kampuchea.

After the establishment of Democratic Kampuchea by the Pol Pot led Khmers Rouges, the Vietnamese communists attempted to establish friendly relations with their weaker neighbour. They celebrated what they described as the "liberation" of Cambodia by the Khmers Rouges. However Pol Pot was driven by a self-destructive combination of paranoia and delusions of grandeur. He provoked the Vietnamese into an unfriendly stance by his attacks upon Vietnamese territory and civilians. And Pol Pot also provided the Vietnamese with recruits for their imperial ambition by terrorising and massacring many of his own political and military cadres. Many Khmers Rouges fled for their lives to Vietnam in 1977 and 1978, and provided the personnel for the governments that Hanoi established in Cambodia from 1979 onwards.

Hanoi's motives were never humanitarian but only self-interested. On the one hand we must not forget that the Vietnamese had a legitimate right to self defence, and the 1978 invasion was consistent with that. But the ten year military occupation, and Hanoi's simultaneous refusal to recognise the noncommunist forces or the resolutions of the United Nations, showed that they were also motivated by an imperial ambition.

Forces beyond the control of Vietnam, especially the collapse of the Soviet Union and its communist bloc, as well as the pressures of China and ASEAN, eventually caused the Vietnamese to withdraw their forces from Cambodia. But some of Vietnam's political influence upon Cambodia still remains.

Extracted from:
- Stephen J. MORRIS : Speech On the Occasion of Public Forum on Khmer Rouge History at Sunway Hotel, 25-26 January 2007


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