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| Gao Briefing Report - Feb. 1996 |
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GAO |
United States
General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20648 |
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National Security and
International Affairs Division
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B-270716
February 29, 1996
The Honorable Benjamin Gilman
Chairman
The Honorable Lee H. Hamilton
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives
The signing of the Paris Peace Accords in October 1991 ended years of
devastating civil war and started Cambodia on the road to building a
democratic civil society. The United Nations Transitional Authority in
Cambodia (UNTAC), established to implement the accords, supervised the
withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia, repatriated over 360,000
refugees, improved human rights conditions, and conducted free and fair
national elections in 1993. UNTAC concluded its mandate in late 1993
with the formation of a duly elected government in Cambodia This report,
which builds on our prior work on UNTAC and Cambodia (see a list of
related GAO products at the end of this report), provides information
about Cambodia's progress since 1993. Specifically, we report on (1)
Cambodia's prospects for holding free and fair national elections by
1998; (2) its progress in meeting international human and political
rights standards; and (3) its progress in clearing millions of land
mines1 left over from decades of war, which is crucial for
economic development and public safety. We briefed members of your staff
about these issues on November 7 and December 19, 1995. This report
summarizes and updates the information we provided at those briefings.
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Background
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By signing the Paris Peace Accords in 1991 and various
international conventions in 1992, Cambodia's leaders agreed to support
a democratic resolution to the country's long-standing civil war, to
protect and advance human and political rights and fundamental freedoms
for all Cambodians, and to begin rebuilding the country's shattered
economy and civil institutions. Cambodia's constitution, adopted in
September 1993, established a multiparty democracy guaranteeing human
rights and the rule of law and seeking economic development and
prosperity. It commits the government to (1) holding new national
elections by 1998; (2) recognizing and respecting human rights as
defined in the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration on
Human Rights, and all treaties and conventions concerning human rights,
women's rights, and children's rights; and (3) promoting economic
development. Achieving sustained progress in the areas of democratic
governance, the protection of human rights, and economic development (1)
is a primary objective of U.S. foreign policy in Southeast Asia and (2)
was a major factor underlying international support for the Paris Peace
Accords and UNTAC, which cost an estimated $2.8 billion. Since the mid-
1980s, U.S. assistance to Cambodia, including peacekeeping, has totaled
nearly $1 billion.
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) had planned to
provide Cambodia about $111 million over 3 years: $29 million in fiscal
year 1994; $42 million in fiscal year 1995; and $40 million in fiscal
year 1996. The USAID Mission in Phnom Penh planned to spend about $8
million to help the Cambodian government plan and prepare for holding
national elections. USAID also funds efforts to improve the functioning
of the National Assembly, the legal system, and the press and to protect
human rights. USAID now says that its planned level of assistance for
fiscal year 1996 will be lower than the $40 million in the executive
branch's initial budget request, and that assistance levels for Cambodia
will be related to congressionally approved levels of assistance
globally.
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1Land mines include antipersonnel and antitank mines,
unexpended and unexploded ordnance, and booby traps. We reported on
mine clearing and related issues in Unexploded Ordnance: A Coordinated
Approach to Detection and Clearance Is Needed
(GAO/NSIAD-96-197, Sept. 20, 1996).
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Results in Brief
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Since UNTAC ended its mandate in late 1993, Cambodia
has made limited progress (1) toward establishing a framework for
holding constitutionally required national elections by 1998, creating
uncertainty about the prospects for a peaceful, democratic transition of
power; (2) meeting international human and political rights standards;
and (3) clearing mines for economic development and public safety.
Progress toward those three objectives is key to sustaining momentum
toward democratic governance, the protection of human rights, and
economic development, according to a variety of U.S., other foreign
government, and Cambodian officials, and nongovernmental organizations.
Sustaining momentum in these areas also is key to maintaining domestic
and international support for the Cambodian government.
Cambodia faces several obstacles to holding constitutionally required
national elections by 1998. The country currently lacks an electoral
framework and the necessary human and financial resources to support the
election process. U.S. and other foreign officials estimate that
creating such a framework will take considerable time and involve many
difficult political decisions, but the Cambodian government has done
little to prepare for national elections at this time and is falling
behind schedule for holding elections by mid-1998. Some U.S. and other
foreign officials doubt whether the Cambodian government can ensure that
elections will be held in a neutral environment where parties can
campaign without violent intimidation and voters will feel secure
against retaliation. Recognizing concerns that the police and armed
forces would interfere with the elections, Cambodia's First Prime
Minister has proposed putting them under the control of an independent,
neutral commission during the elections. Other obstacles to free and
fair elections include opposition parties' lack of fair access to the
media and disparity in the relative strengths of the political parties.
Although conditions have improved since the end of its civil war,
Cambodia has made limited progress in meeting basic international human
rights standards. According to human rights groups, military and police
forces remain ineffective and corrupt and continue to violate human
rights frequently. These groups and some U.S. and other foreign
officials said that few Cambodians had received due process or fair
trials in the past 2 years, in part because prosecutors and judges
lacked basic training to properly investigate, prepare, present, and
decide cases. These same sources reported that official corruption was
widespread and growing, undermining the rule of law. Several U.S.
officials noted that low-level corruption partly reflected the low pay
for Cambodia's bureaucracy, including military, police, and other
officials.
In the area of political rights, recent government actions suggest
increasing intolerance for dissenting opinion, both inside and outside
the government. One outspoken member was expelled from the National
Assembly for publicly attacking government corruption, and others said
they were threatened if they continued to criticize the government.
During the past year, the government prosecuted several members of the
press for criticizing government corruption, enacted press restrictions,
and tolerated violent attacks on some press members.
The presence of millions of land mines imposes a heavy economic and
social burden on Cambodia, already one of the poorest nations in the
world. According to several studies, mine-clearing experts, and U.S. and
foreign officials, these mines (1) deny access to vast tracts of
farmland, forests, and other natural resources, which represents a huge
economic loss, and (2) interfere with the resettlement and reintegration
of refugees. Nevertheless, the Cambodian government has cleared little
land of mines and devoted few resources to the task since 1993. The U.S.
government has provided some funds, training, equipment, and supplies
for mine clearing to the Cambodian Mine Action Center and the Cambodian
armed forces. Nonetheless, according to available reports, mine-clearing
experts, and U.S. and other foreign officials, the Cambodian
government's lack of leadership, planning, and funding for mine clearing
are among the most important factors explaining the lack of progress in
this area.
Further information about elections, human and political rights, and
land mines is provided in briefing sections I, II, and III,
respectively.
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Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
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The Departments of Defense and State and USAID
generally agreed with the information presented in a draft of this
report, but preferred to focus on the progress Cambodia had made since
the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in 1991 rather than the more
limited progress that has occurred since UNTAC completed its mandate in
late 1993. In addition, they said that Cambodian society had been
shattered by decades of civil war, but that the country had the
potential, with international assistance and support, to make progress
on many of the problems our report discusses, and noted that Cambodian
leaders had publicly promised to hold elections, respect the rule of
law, and protect human rights. For example, with regard to human rights,
the Department of State and USAID emphasized the improvements that have
occurred as compared with circumstances that prevailed prior to 1991,
and the Department of Defense said that it is important to note the
persistence of critics who are not intimidated by the government's
return to autocratic methods. The Department of Defense said that
erecting a framework for conducting a fair election by 1998 is not
entirely outside the realm of possibility, and the Department of State
said that the important issue is to have free and fair elections, not
that they be held as scheduled in May 1998.
We recognize that decades of civil war and the Khmer Rouge's genocidal
rule had a devastating effect on Cambodian society, and that the
Cambodian government faces serious problems of institution-building,
exacerbated by widespread corruption, a poorly staffed and trained
judicial system, and an ongoing Khmer Rouge insurgency. However, using
this past as a benchmark for measuring the current government's progress
can be misleading because UNTAC was principally responsible for
improvements between 1991 and 1993. We believe that the standards of
behavior set out in the provisions of the Paris Accords implemented by
UNTAC, other international conventions that Cambodia has signed, and
Cambodia's constitution are the appropriate standards for assessing the
current government's progress toward democratic governance and
protecting human rights-not the conditions of genocide and civil war
that existed prior to 1991. In signing these documents, Cambodia's
leaders promised to abide by their provisions in rebuilding Cambodia
However, the evidence shows that since 1993 the Cambodian government has
yet to make much progress toward these goals, and some recent actions,
such as restricting press freedoms and declaring a new opposition party
illegal, are inconsistent with the government's public commitment to
free elections, the rule of law, and the protection of human and
political rights. Underscoring our concerns are reports that government
forces raided the headquarters of a new opposition party in late January
1996 and held party members at gun point.
Comments from the Departments of Defense and State and USAID are
reprinted in their entirety in appendixes I, II, and III, respectively,
along with our evaluation of them.
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Scope and Methodology
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To obtain information for this report, we conducted
fieldwork in Cambodia and Thailand and at the Departments of Defense and
State, the U.S. Pacific Command, USAID, and the United Nations. At these
locations, we met with key U.S., Cambodian, other foreign government,
and U.N. Officials and with representatives of a variety of
nongovernmental organizations. In Thailand, these included the U.S.
Ambassador, political officer, and military attaché; Thai
military officials; and representatives from the United Nations and
refugee assistance groups. In Cambodia, these included the U.S.
Ambassador, the Deputy Chief of Mission, the Acting USAID Mission
Director, the USAID democracy programs officer, the U.S. Pacific Command
Representative, and the Humanitarian Assistance Demining Coordinator;
Cambodia's Secretary of State and President of the Council of Ministers,
foreign advisors, and Members of the Cambodian National Assembly,
including the chairmen of the foreign affairs and human rights
commissions; diplomats at the Australian, British, French, and
Indonesian embassies; representatives of the United Nations Development
Program, the United Nations Center for Human Rights, the Asia
Foundation, several human rights groups, and two policy research
institutions; and foreign civilian and military advisors at the
Cambodian Mine Action Center. We also reviewed and analyzed many
reports, studies, and other documents about Cambodia, plus the Paris
Peace Accords and other international treaties to which the Cambodian
government is a party.
We conducted our review from May to December 1995 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional
committees, the Secretaries of Defense and State, the USAID
Administrator, and other interested parties. Copies will be made
available to others on request.
Please contact me at (202) 5124128 if you or your staff have any
questions about this report. Major contributors to this report were
Tetsuo Miyabara, Michael Rohrback, and Michael Zola.
(Signed)
Harold J. Johnson
Associate Director
International Relations and Trade Issues
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Abbreviations
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BLDP |
Buddhist
Liberal Democratic Party
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CMAC |
Cambodian
Mine Action Center
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CPP |
Cambodian
People's Party
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FUNCINPEC |
National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful,
and Cooperative Cambodia
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NGO |
nongovernmental organization
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RCAF |
Royal
Cambodian Armed Forces
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UNCHR |
United
Nations Center for Human Rights
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UNTAC |
United
Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
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USAID |
U.S. Agency
for International Development
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Briefing Section I
Holding Free and Fair National Elections by 1998
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No election law or framework
Limited human and financial resources
International assistance uncertain
Proposed local elections in 1997 may divert funding, people, and
attention
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Cambodia's constitution requires
that the government hold national elections by 1998. However, the
country currently lacks the electoral framework (laws, regulations, an
independent commission) and resources (both human and financial) needed
to hold elections. Although U.S. and other foreign officials estimate
that creating such a framework will take considerable time and involve
many difficult political decisions, little has been accomplished so far.
In late 1995, the Cambodian government began drafting an electoral law.
Discussion at a late October 1995 seminar, sponsored partly by the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID), explored the relative
advantages of different types of electoral systems. By December 1995,
the government still had not completed a draft electoral law and was
falling behind a proposed timetable for holding elections in mid-1998
(see table I. 1).
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Table I.1: National Election Timetablefor Cambodia
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Event |
Timing
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Draft national election law
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November 1995 (not met) |
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Interior Ministry reviews draft law
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December 1995 (not met) |
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Co-Prime Ministers review draft law
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January-February 1996 |
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Draft law submitted to the National
Assembly
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Spring 1996 |
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National Assembly enacts law
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Summer 1996 |
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Implement new law (create an
election 1997 committee, issue regulations, train workers, educate
voters)
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1997 |
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Hold national elections |
May 1998 |
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Source: Pre-election technical assessment for Cambodia prepared by
the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, August 1995.
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According to U.S. and other foreign
officials, Cambodia lacks the human and financial resources needed to
hold an election on the scale of the one held by the United Nations in
1993. The U.N. electoral assistance unit could help plan and organize
the elections, but this would require a significant financial commitment
from the international community. Although some international assistance
may be provided, such as election monitors, some U.S. and other foreign
officials doubt that the international community will support a costly,
large-scale operation to help conduct the elections.
The Cambodian government currently appoints local officials but has
proposed holding local elections in 1996 or 1997. Some U.S., other
foreign government, and Cambodian officials support holding local
elections because they would introduce democratic practices at the local
level. Other such officials oppose holding local elections because they
would divert limited financial and human resources from the task of
holding national elections and/or because antidemocratic government
officials could use local elections as evidence of democratic progress
and then cancel national elections.
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CPP-controlled Interior Ministry is drafting election law
- drafting process is not open to public comment and
participation
- CPP used Ministry to intimidate opponents before 1993
elections
Fear of violence and intimidation by CPP is a key concern for other
parties |
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Even if the Cambodian government
holds national elections by 1998, some U.S. and other foreign officials
and experts doubt they would be free and fair. The Interior Ministry is
drafting the election law and may be responsible for organizing the
elections. Ministry deliberations and work are not open to public
oversight and participation, and the Ministry played a role in the
violence and intimidation before the 1993 elections.
According to some U.S. and other foreign government officials,
nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and others, the Cambodian
government cannot ensure that parties could campaign without violent
intimidation and that voters would feel free from retaliation. The
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was unable to
control key government ministries before the 1993 elections, and the
Cambodian People's Party (CPP') used some of them to sponsor violence
against its political opponents. Some foreign officials and reports
point out that CPP still controls the Interior Ministry and its internal
security forces, plus the armed forces. Several NGOS report that fear of
politically motivated violence is a key issue for members of the
National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and
Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) and the Buddhist Liberal Democratic
Party (BLDP) but not for CPP members.
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of State noted
that Prime Minister Ranariddh has proposed establishing an independent,
neutral commission under the King to control the police and armed forces
during the elections to prevent them from intervening in the elections.
However, we question the effectiveness of such a commission in
controlling the police and armed forces when UNTAC, with over 20,000
personnel. was unable to control them before the 1993 elections.
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| GAO |
Cambodia Faces Obstacles to Holding Free and Fair Elections
(cont'd) |
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Voters lack widely-available sources of accurate information about
the elections, particularly radio
Political parties other than CPP are weak and lack the leadership,
organization, and resources to campaign effectively |
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UNTAC officials knew that providing
Cambodian voters with accurate information was essential for free and
fair elections. Consequently, guaranteeing fair access to the media
especially radio, because most Cambodians are illiterate and television
stations have limited broadcast areas-for all political parties was an
essential element of UNTAC'S pre-election strategy. Several studies
conclude that the 1993 elections probably could not have taken place or
succeeded without the flow of information provided largely by
"Radio UNTAC." Unfortunately, Cambodia currently lacks widely-
available media sources of accurate information. Although more than 30
newspapers operate in Cambodia, they have limited nationwide
distribution and the quality of their news reporting is unreliable.
Also, the government tightly controls broadcast media licenses, limiting
opposition parties' access to radio and television. For example, a BLDP
official told us that the government had turned down the party's
application for a radio station license. Moreover, as discussed later,
the government has grown increasingly intolerant of dissenting opinions.
USAID'S strategy for promoting democracy in Cambodia recognizes the
media's weaknesses; one of its objectives is to increase media access
and professionalism. In commenting on a draft of this report, the
Department of Defense said that, despite restricted access to the media,
outspoken government critics still may be able to generate popular
support and influence the elections.
With the possible exception of CPP, Cambodian political parties lack the
leadership, organization, and financial resources to conduct effective
national campaigns, according to U.S. and other foreign officials and
reports and other documents we reviewed. Over a decade of single-party
rule has given CPP the opportunity to build a solid party structure
(largely indistinguishable from the government bureaucracy) at the
provincial, district, communal, and village levels. Meanwhile, U.S.
officials and NGOS indicate that FUNCINPEC and BLDP have weak party
structures at these levels and are further weakened by political
infighting. Given their weak party structure and disunity, several NGOS
and others conclude that the parties will be unable to compete
effectively in future elections.
USAID plans to provide training to strengthen the capabilities of all
political parties to participate in the election. However, several
observers suggested that CPP, with its generally better organization and
structure, might benefit disproportionately from such training. Several
U.S., other foreign government, and NGO officials questioned the wisdom
of providing training to strengthen any of the existing parties because
they are undemocratic and authoritarian. USAID officials said that they
plan to fund training for grassroots civic organizations instead of
established political parties. The National Democratic Institute
suspended political party training in Cambodia in 1995 but plans to work
with other NGOS to train election monitors and educate voters.
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Briefing Section II
Meeting Human and Political Rights Standards
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Military and police forces continue to violate human rights
frequently
Few Cambodians receive due process or fair trials
Prisons remain overcrowded, and prisoners are mistreated
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Cambodia has ratified and agreed to
abide by all major international agreements guaranteeing human and
political rights, for example, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. Yet the current government has made limited progress
since late 1993 in meeting the basic international human rights
standards contained in these agreements. Indeed, some U.S., other
foreign government, and Cambodian officials and NGOS conclude that
Cambodia's human rights situation worsened during 1995.
According to human rights NGOS, the United Nations Center for Human
Rights (UNCHR) office in Phnom Penh, and USAID documents, Cambodian
military and police forces continued to violate human rights frequently
during the past 2 years. These sources reported numerous cases of
extortion, beatings, robberies, and other violations by soldiers and
police. USAID and Cambodian officials and others noted that this problem
touches on the larger issue of desperately needed reforms of the
Cambodian bureaucracy, including the provision of adequate pay for
police, military, and other government officials to reduce or eliminate
low-level corruption, which currently is endemic.
According to human rights NGOS, UNCHR, some U.S. and Cambodian
officials, and USAID documents (1) few Cambodians had received due
process or fair trials in the past 2 years; (2) prosecutors and judges
lacked basic training and skills for properly investigating, preparing,
presenting, and deciding cases; and (3) trained public defenders
remained scarce. They also said that official corruption was widespread
and growing, undermining the rule of law, and that the government had
resisted some legislators' attempts to introduce anti-corruption
legislation in the National Assembly.
Human rights NGOS and UNCHR told us that Cambodia's prisons remain
overcrowded and still fall short of meeting basic international and
humanitarian standards for the treatment of prisoners. In late 1994,
NGOS reported that they found a secret government prison where prisoners
were tortured and denied basic human needs. According to the Department
of State, this Prison was closed in 1994.
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Outspoken member was expelled from the National Assembly, and others
have been intimidated
The government has prosecuted several editors, condoned violence
against the press, and enacted press restrictions
Cambodia's co-Prime Ministers attempted to close the U.N. human
rights office in Phnom Penh
|
| In the area of political rights,
recent government actions indicate increasing official intolerance for
dissenting opinion, both inside and outside the government. This
intolerance has had a chilling effect on efforts to improve the
Cambodian government's effectiveness and reduce corruption, according to
USAID, several foreign government officials, NGOS, and members of
Cambodia's National Assembly. Reported examples of increasing
intolerance include the following:
- One outspoken member was expelled from the National Assembly for
publicly attacking government corruption and other problems, and other
members have been threatened with expulsion if they speak out.
- The government closed some newspapers and prosecuted several members
of the press, enacted restrictions on press freedoms, and tightly
controlled broadcast licenses. Several members of the press were beaten
or killed and their attackers set free. The government attempted to
silence the free press by criticizing an existing journalists'
association and pressuring journalists to join a competing association
formed and controlled by the government. Government officials justified
press restrictions by pointing to irresponsible reporting on the part of
some newspapers.
- Cambodia's co-Prime Ministers attempted to close the UNCHR office in
Phnom Penh in response to its criticism of human rights abuses, but
backed down under international (including U.S. government) pressure.
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Briefing Section
III
Clearing Land Mines
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Mines deny access to farmland, forests, and other natural
resources
Mines hinder infrastructure reconstruction and development
Mines kill and disable able-bodied workers and overburden Cambodia's
weak medical and social infrastructure
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The presence of millions of land
mines denies Cambodians access to vast tracts of farmland, forests, and
other natural resources. Prior to 1970, Cambodia was a net exporter of
food; it is now a net importer. Battambang and Svey Rieng provinces were
once the most productive areas, respectively considered Cambodia's
"breadbasket" and "rice bowl." Mines now make
substantial areas in these two provinces unusable. The lack of mine-free
farmland was one of several factors that forced UNTAC to cancel plans to
provide land to refugees returning to Cambodia from Thai border camps
and is a key factor in their present poverty and food insecurity. Only
about 20 square kilometers of land have been cleared of mines since
1992, enough to support only a few thousand refugees (thousands more
await resettlement).
Land mines also hinder infrastructure reconstruction and development,
which in turn hinders agricultural, industrial, and tourism development.
For example, before roads or bridges can be repaired, the surrounding
area must be cleared of mines.
According to some studies, the majority of land mine casualties are some
of Cambodia's most able-bodied workers, young males aged 16 to 35. Land
mine casualties overburden Cambodia's weak medical and social
infrastructure. Studies show that land mine injuries consume a
disproportionate share of Cambodia's hospital resources. Cambodia has
the greatest proportion of amputees in the world, according to several
studies and reports.
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Cambodia's land mine problem is extensive
Operational factors complicate land mine clearance
U.S.-trained RCAF units lack funding, leadership, and a clear
mission
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Several factors explain Cambodia's
lack of progress in clearing mines. A major factor is the sheer extent
of the problem. An estimated 4 million to 10 million land mines are
widely distributed throughout the country. One minefield in southeast
Cambodia is 54 kilometers long and contains an estimated 360,000 mines.
Another on Cambodia's border with Thailand is over 600 kilometers long
and contains an estimated 2 million to 3 million mines. The following
operational factors compound the problem and make clearing Cambodian
minefields particularly difficult:
- Limited information exists about the exact location of the
minefields.
- Cambodian minefields are extremely dense by western military
standards and display little order or pattern.
- Humanitarian mine-clearing operations are costly and time-consuming.
- One estimate places the cost of clearing a single mine at $300 to
$1,000.
- The manual mine-clearing techniques used are slow, and attempts to
clear mines mechanically have so far been unsuccessful.
- The ongoing Khmer Rouge insurgency limits access to some areas, and
Khmer Rouge forces continue to lay mines.
Since 1994, U.S. military forces have trained and equipped several Royal
Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) mine-clearing units as part of the U.S.
government's nonlethal military assistance program to Cambodia. U.S.
military officials and others report that mine-clearing efforts by these
units have been hindered by limited operational funding from the
Cambodian government, poor senior leadership, and lack of a clear
mission. U.S. military officials in Cambodia estimated that these units
had cleared less than 1 square kilometer of land.
Some U.S. and other foreign officials have urged the Cambodian
government to reorganize, retrain, and reorient the RCAF for a dual
security and reconstruction role, including mine clearing. Senior
Cambodian government and military officials have proposed some helpful
changes, but their commitment to these proposals is uncertain. USAID
officials questioned the effectiveness of using the Cambodian military
in a dual role, based on their experience with dual role militaries
elsewhere.
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| GAO |
Limited Progress Made in Clearing Land Mines (cont'd) |
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CMAC mine-clearing efforts hindered by inadequate funding
Cambodian government has promised CMAC $10 million through 2000, but
additional international support needed
Cambodia lacks a strategic plan that integrates mine clearing with
economic development
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The Cambodian Mine Action Center's
(CMAC) mine-clearing efforts have been hindered from its start by
limited funding. CMAC was established in June 1992 to create a Cambodian
institution to continue mine-clearing and related activities after the
completion of UNTAC'S mandate. CMAC focuses on mine clearing for
humanitarian, rather than development, purposes. CMAC reports progress
in clearing mines and reducing mine-related casualties, but experts
estimate it will take decades to eliminate mines from Cambodia, given
current techniques and efforts.
CMAC was unable to secure sufficient funding from international donors
to complete its initial 30-month, $20 million operating program,
scheduled to end April 30, 1996. In June 1995, the U.N.-sponsored trust
fund established to finance the program contained only about $1.5
million, an amount sufficient for about 3 more months of operations. At
that time, there were no plans or mechanisms in place for obtaining
additional donor funding after the trust fund expired at the end of
April 1996, and the Cambodian government had not budgeted funds to
support CMAC once donor funding ended. Foreign technical advisers and
others said that CMAC could not operate without the trust fund,
additional donor support, and continued foreign technical assistance.
CMAC officials and its 1994 annual report suggested that providing mine-
clearing services on a reimbursable basis might allow CMAC to generate
sufficient revenues to become self-financing, and noted that the
contractor for a U.S.-funded road building project employs CMAC-trained
mine-clearing teams.
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of State said
that the United Nations Development Program had agreed to extend the
trust fund for a few years and that the Cambodian government had pledged
to provide $1 million to CMAC in 1996 and a total of $10 million through
2000. The Department also noted that, given the size of Cambodia's land
mine problem, continued international assistance will be necessary for
some time.
Cambodia's national development strategy does not directly address
specific mine-clearing objectives, priorities, or requirements
associated with various development objectives. Also, it has yet to
integrate RCAF, CMAC, or NGO mine clearing, or assign them roles or
tasks. CMAC has been tasked to develop a national mine-clearing
strategy, but it is not scheduled to complete this task until July 1996.
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Appendix I
Comments From the Department of Defense
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Note: GAO comments supplementing
those in the report text appear at the end of this appendix.
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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON D.C. 20301-2400
Mr, Harold J. Johnson
Associate Director
International Relations and Trade Issues
National Security and International Affairs Division
U.S. General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20548
Dear Mr. Johnson:
A key point of the GAO study entitled "Cambodia: Limited
Progress on Elections, Human Rights, and Mine Clearing, " (GAO/NSIAD-96,
OSD Case Number 1066) is that Cambodia confronts a range of significant
obstacles to conducting a fair election in 1998, including the lack of
an electoral framework. In our view, however, erecting that framework in
an effective way is not entirely outside of the realm of the possible,
especially with continued international support and reminders from
countries including the U.S. of the importance of undertaking this task
with deliberate speed. While there are bureaucratic and political
impediments to such an undertaking, (See comment 1.) the Cambodian population
demonstrated once before how willing it was to take part in the expression
of individual political preference.
The GAO report also makes the case that there has been limited
human rights progress, and an increasing government intolerance of
criticism and dissent. However, it is important to take note of the
persistence of critics (See comment 2.) who have demonstrated that
they will not be cowed by a return to autocratic methods on the part of
the government. The report indicates that the possibility of establishing
a "neutral environment" for the electoral competitors seems remote,
and access to the media is restricted in a manner that almost certainly
spells disaster for parties that seek to compete with incumbent
organizations. Yet somehow the message from vocal critics such as Sam Rainsy
and Khem Sokha seems to get through and to gain some currency in the
countryside. It is not a foregone conclusion that these challengers will
simply be unable to develop a following against all odds; they seem to (See comment 3.)
have a slim but salient chance of exerting influence over politics in
Cambodia's near-term future.
It is also incorrect to assert, as does the GAO report (on the basis
of "officials and other sources"), that the Cambodian People's
Party (CPP) controls the police and the military. While it is correct to
say that the CPP "controls" the Ministry of Interior, in that
the portfolio is in the hands of a party stalwart, it appears that the
police are loyal to Sar Kheng and his associates, representing a faction
of the CPP. That loyalty has more to do with personal alliances and
support for the views espoused by the likes of Sin Song, (See comment 4.)
who plotted the last abortive coup, than it has to do with commitments to the
party itself.
On the matter of CPP control of the military, however, the report is
wrong to assume that the CPP, or any of the other parties from which the
national army was fashioned in 1993, still exert command over the lion's
share of resources or factional loyalties. In spite of being
disorganized, topheavy, beset with a major budgetary problem, diminished
morale and weak leadership, the military has come to function as a
national force. The careful balance of CPP and FUNCINPEC military
leadership at the highest levels, a unifying mission represented by the
lingering Khmer Rouge threat. and strong Western guidance toward
military professionalism have contributed to the emergence of a troubled
but unified military. Indeed, the military remained neutral during two
failed coup attempts, orchestrated by the conservative wing of the CPP
in concert with Ranarith's brother, Prince Chakrapong, who had thrown in
with the CPP in 1993. That certainly helped the government to weather
those action . Moreover, Hun Sen has come to rely on a palace guard as
his protection force, largely because he was not (See comment 4.)
inclined to count on the loyalty of a military that has stood by the side
of the government without choosing sides.
In short, the GAO report seems to lack a sense that this is a dynamic
system with an emerging momentum. The political trends will not
necessarily be conducive to the forces that oppose efforts to level the
playing field, put in place appropriate legislation governing media
access and freedom of expression, and work to enable individuals to
organize and criticize the incumbents. The relationship between some
political critics and the Overseas Cambodian community, the connections
of various political challengers to western countries, the fact that the
CPP itself is developing cleavages, the tendency of some pockets of CPP
influence to look to establish relationships with interests external to
normal coalition partners all combine to suggest a potential for
political change that should be factored into the grim, realistic but
one-dimensional picture of the Cambodian situation depicted in the
report.
Finally, while page 25 (Now on p. 21) of the GAO Report state that
only 20 square kilometers have been cleared of mines, the Royal Cambodian
Armed Forces estimates that as of October 1995 (See comment 5.) military units
had cleared over five million square meters and approximately 400 kilometers
of road.
Sincerely,
(Signed)
Kurt M. Campbell
Deputy Assistant secretary of Defense
(Asian and Pacific Affairs)
|
|
The following are GAO'S comments on
the Department of Defense's letter dated January 5, 1996.
|
GAO Comments
| 1. The obstacles to holding
free and fair elections in Cambodia are not insurmountable; however, the
Cambodian government does not appear to be drafting an election law in a
manner that will allow reasonable time or opportunity for public comment
and participation and/or election preparations. The Cambodian people
were willing to express their political will at the polls in 1993;
however, lack of progress in overcoming these obstacles may deny them an
opportunity to express their will freely in 1998.
2. While some critics persist in speaking out
against official corruption and human rights violations, they express
their opinions in an increasingly hostile environment, which includes
the threat of imprisonment or death. That they continue to speak out may
be more a tribute to their individual courage than to the state of
freedom of expression in Cambodia
3. We have revised our report to reflect this
information.
4. Whether the police are more loyal to a faction
of the CPP than the party itself does not alter concerns that they will
be used to sponsor violence against political opponents, as they were in
1993. In addition, although the armed forces apparently remained neutral
during two failed coup attempts, nevertheless, some foreign officials
remain concerned that CPP will use the armed forces, or some of its
elements, to sponsor violence against political opponents. As the
Department of State noted in its comments, First Prime Minister
Ranariddh has proposed establishing an independent, neutral commission
under the King to control the police and the armed forces to avoid their
"improper intervention" in the electoral process.
5. We included an estimate of the amount of land
cleared of mines by the RCAF for humanitarian purposes in calculating
the total area cleared. For clarity we note that 5 million square meters
equals 5 square kilometers.
|
Appendix II
Comments From the Department of State
|
|
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the
report text appear at the end of this appendix.
|
United States Department of State
Chief Financial Officer
Washington, D.C. 20520-7427
December 19, 1995
Dear Mr. Hinton:
We appreciate the opportunity to provide Department of State
comments on your draft report, "CAMBODIA: Limited Progress on
Elections, Human Rights, and Mine Clearing," GAO Job Code
711138.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please call Ms.
Eunice Reddick, EAP/VLC, at (202) 647-3133.
Sincerely,
(Signed)
Richard L. Greene
Enclosure:
As stated.
cc:
GAO - Mr. Miyabara
State/EAP/VLC - Ms. Reddick
Mr. Henry L. Hinton, Jr,
Assistant Comptroller General,
National Security and International Affairs,
U.S. General Accounting Office.
|
|
GAO Draft Report: "CAMBODIA: Limited Progress on Elections,
Human Rights, and Mine Clearing."
GAO Job Code 711138
SUMMARY
Our major issue with the GAO description of Cambodia is that it
looks at all three areas--elections, human rights and demining--out of
context. Although the facts in the report are generally correct, the
content has been highly selective. The problem is not so much what is in
the report as what is left out. It is impossible to evaluate current
conditions and prospects for Cambodia objectively without taking the
country's history into account. While there is no question much remains
to be done, the Cambodian people, with the assistance of the United
States and other interested countries, are making considerable efforts
to address these challenges. If the report is to make a constructive
contribution to our understanding of Cambodia, these efforts must be
given their due. (See comment 1.)
Background
While helping the Cambodians hold elections, improving human
rights, and clearing mines were all important elements of UNTAC's
responsibilities, the report does not adequately (See comment 2.) describe
UNTAC's mandate. UNTAC was charged with helping Cambodia conduct free
and fair elections in 1993, supervising the withdrawal of Vietnamese
officials and advisors from Cambodia, enabling Cambodian refugees to return,
demobilizing the military forces of the various factions, and improving
human rights conditions in order to prevent the return of the Khmer Rouge.
With the exception of demobilizing all the military factions, which was
impossible in Khmer Rouge areas due to active opposition, UNTAC succeeded
on all these fronts. (See comment 3.) UNTAC's mandate ended in
1993 with the formation of the duly elected Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC).
The degree of success of UNTAC and of the RGC is evident when we
examine where Cambodia was before the Paris Peace Accords of October,
1991, four years ago. Cambodia had been engaged for a decade in a bloody
civil war between various factions, which was ended by the Paris Accords
and the formation of UNTAC. The Khmer Rouge, whose genocidal policies
had led to the deaths of over a million Cambodians through executions,
mistreatment and disease during the 1970s, posed a serious military
threat to the Cambodian government. That government, the State of
Cambodia, had been established as the result of a Vietnamese invasion of
the country in 1979; it was a Marxist-Leninist regime that did not
tolerate political opposition or allow freedom of expression. The Khmer
Rouge had tried to wipe out Cambodia's professional or skilled
population; the lucky ones fled abroad, creating over 370,000 refugees.
Cambodia's economy, infrastructure, and education (See comment 3.) and health
systems were devastated as a result of decades of conflict.
GAO Draft Report: "CAMBODIA: Limited Progress on Elections
Human Rights, and Mine Clearing.
GAO Job Code 711138
-2-
Cambodians are eager to shape their own political future, as
evidenced by the willingness of over 90 percent of the (See comment 4.)
electorate to brave intimidation from the Khmer Rouge and cross heavily mined
countryside to vote in 1993. Cambodia now has a (See comment 5.) multiparty
government officially committed to democracy and human rights. There are over
100 viable nongovernmental (See comment 6.) organizations working on
human rights and development. In addition there are over 50 electronic and
print media in the country, (See comment 7.) including persistent critics
of the government. Cambodia is rebuilding its civil society and its people
are enjoying peace for the first time in 30 years. While the Khmer Rouge are
still fighting government troops, planting mines, killing villagers and
burning homes and crops, their strength is steadily declining.
Of course, the process of democratization and development is not an
easy one. The government faces serious problems of institution-building,
exacerbated by widespread corruption, a poorly staffed and trained
judicial system, and the weakening but ongoing Khmer Rouge insurgency.
But it is unfair and unrealistic to expect Cambodia's government, after
decades of turmoil and centuries of authoritarian rule, to become a
model (See comment 8.) democracy in the two years since it was formed.
Our support for democratization is aimed at educating Cambodians about the
rights and responsibilities they should enjoy under a democracy. We should
recognize that Cambodia is a country in transition which can, with assistance,
successfully conduct the next round of elections, improve human rights
protections, and continue demining efforts. Cambodians in and out of
government have committed themselves to achieving these goals, and with
targeted technical assistance by the U.S. and other donors and sustained
diplomatic efforts, we expect these goals can be achieved. (See comment 9.)
GAO Draft Report: "Cambodia: Limited Progress on Elections,
Human Rights, and Mine Clearing."
GAO Job Code 711138
- 3 -
SPECIFIC COMMENTS
Results in Brief
At several points, the report states that "U.S.officials"
believe certain things. This is misleading. While the report may be
accurately conveying the views expressed by some individuals, their remarks
cannot and should not be taken as an expression of official policy. We have
no objection if the report refers to these individuals as "foreign
officials" or "Western officials," but there should be no
implication that their views are those of the U.S. government. (See comment 10.)
Para. two of this section states that the RGC has "enacted press
restrictions." This is an inadequate description of the new press law
enacted in July, which contains both praiseworthy and potentially problematic
provisions. See discussion on human rights below.
Para. three states Cambodia's government has cleared little land of
mines and devoted few resources to the task. This sentence in misleading.
See discussion on mining below.
Agency Comments:
Cambodia's 1996 budget may not have identified funding for
preliminary election activities, but this is probably because the
electoral law that will establish the framework for elections is still
being drafted. We would anticipate that once the law is promulgated,
funding decisions will follow. (See comment 11.)
Appendix I.. Prospects for Free and Fair National Elections in 1998:
The table for scheduling elections in mid-1998 is not set in stone.
The important thing is to have free and fair elections, not that they be
held in May, 1998. (See comment 12.) Although drafting the elect on law
may not be in strict accord with the suggested timetable, it is more important
that the draft be done thoughtfully after a thorough exchange of views. The
October 1995 seminar referred to was an important opportunity for different
groups to engage in an open exchange of views and to take advantage If the
experience of other countries in the region. (See comment 13.)
On page 12, (Now on p. 11)it is not clear who the "others"
are who oppose local elections; in any case their opinions are highly
speculative. (See comment 14.)
The discussion of the drafting of the election law does point out
some valid concerns about the transparency of the process. It fails to
consider that the Interior Ministry is only responsible for the first
draft, however. As the draft is vetted within the government and then
the National Assembly, it can change considerably. That is what happened
with the labor law. which went through several versions before it met basic
GAO Draft Report: "CAMBODIA: Limited Progress on Elections,
Human Rights, and Mine Clearing."
GAO Job Code 711138
- 4 -
(See comment 15.) international standards. First Prime Minister
Ranariddh has proposed that an independent neutral commission be established
under the King with control of all armed forces and police to avoid improper
intervention in the electoral process. (See comment 11.)
Appendix II. Progress Toward Meeting Human and Political Rights Standards:
On page 20, (Now on p. 17.) the report states that the government
has resisted attempts to introduce anti-corruption legislation. (See comment 11.)
In fact, the Council of Ministers and National Assembly are working together
on draft anti-corruption legislation.
It is true that NGOs reported finding a secret prison where prisoners
were being abused. The report fails to mention that the prison was closed in
1994. (See comment 11.)
On page 22, (Now on p. 19.) the report accused the RGC of enacting
restrictions on press freedom. In July, the National Assembly passed
legislation that protected confidentiality of sources and prohibited
pre-publication censorship. The law does not contain criminal penalties.
It does contain provisions prohibiting publication of "information
which affects national security and political stability." Cambodian
officials have promised that "national security" will be
defined in separate legislation. (See comment 16.)
Journalists in Cambodia are not being forced to join associations
controlled by the government. There are now at least three different
journalist associations in Cambodia with different editorial
perspectives. (See comment 17.)
Appendix III. Progress Clearing Land Mines:
The Cambodia Mine Action Center has demined 15.4 square kilometers
of land in the last two years, allowing 13,000 displaced families to be
resettled. The amount of land cleared from January to September, 1995 was
up 358 over 1994. CMAC's specific goal is to clear 10 square kilometers of
land per year; the amount is limited because painstaking manual techniques
are necessary. CMAC also has an extensive mine awareness program to educate
the public throughout Cambodia about the dangers of mines, and has trained
3,000 deminers. (See comment 18.)
The UNDP has agreed to administer CMAC's trust fund for the next few
years. The Cambodian government has pledged to contribute $1 million to CMAC
in 1996. RGC contributions through the year 2000 will total $10 million, which
compares favorably with total contributions to the CMAC trust fund of
$15.6 million. CMAC is developing a national demining plan for Cambodia.
Given the size of the landmine problem in Cambodia, international assistance
will continue to be necessary for some time to come. (See comment 11.) The
U.S. has also provided humanitarian assistance through the Department of
Defense, including giving mine clearance,
GAO Draft Report: "CAMBODIA: Limited Progress on Election,
Human Rights, and Mine Clearing."
GAO Job Code 711138
- 5 -
medical, and mine awareness training to the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces.
The State Department Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration contributed
over $1 million from 1992 to 1993 for demining as well as funds for
repatriation of refugees. FMF funds have also been used to purchase demining
equipment for Cambodia, including detectors, explosives and blasting caps for
disposal. USCINCPAC personnel made a thorough assessment of this assistance
in late 1995 and concluded results had been positive. (See comment 19.)
|
|
The following are GAO'S comments on
the Department of State's letter dated December 19, 1995.
|
GAO Comments
| 1. We recognize the devastating
effects decades of civil war and the Khmer Rouge's genocidal rule had on
Cambodian society. However, using this past as a benchmark to measure
the current Cambodian government's progress since UNTAC ended its
mandate in 1993 can be misleading because UNTAC was principally
responsible for much of the improvement in Cambodia between 1991 and
1993. We believe that the standards of behavior set out in the Paris
Peace Accords, the various international conventions that Cambodia has
signed, and the Cambodian constitution are appropriate standards against
which to measure the current government's progress-not the conditions of
genocide and civil war that existed prior to 1991.
2. Achieving sustained progress toward democratic
governance, the protection of human rights, and economic development in
Cambodia were key factors underlying international support for UNTAC
(and the formulation of the specific components of its mandate) and
continue to be key objectives of U.S. foreign policy. Continued progress
on the three specific issues our report addresses-holding free and fair
elections by 1998, meeting international human and political rights
standards, and clearing land mines is key to sustaining momentum in
those three broader areas, according to many officials and experts we
interviewed. Failure to successfully address the three specific issues
discussed in this report could undermine international support for
Cambodia, according to these same officials and experts.
3. Our report recognizes UNTAC'S contributions to
improving conditions in Cambodia.
4. While the Cambodian people are eager to express
their political will in national elections, the obstacles we cite
regarding free and fair elections, if unresolved, could deny the
Cambodian people an opportunity to express their will freely.
5. While the Cambodian government is officially
committed to democracy and human rights, some recent actions, such as
declaring a newly formed opposition political party illegal, appear
inconsistent with the government's official policy. USAID'S 1995
strategy for promoting democracy in Cambodia notes that some observers
sensed a return to "traditional authoritarian ways" in
1995.
6. Although domestic and international human rights
groups work on improving human rights in Cambodia these organizations
have reported facing increasing intimidation from government
authorities, as the Department recognizes in its February 1995 human
rights report. Human rights groups also are concerned that no law
authorizes them to operate in Cambodia and that the government might use
this lack of legal status to curtail their future operations. As noted
in our report, the co-Prime Ministers attempted to close the UNCHR
office in Phnom Penh because of its criticism of human rights abuses.
Recognizing such concerns, USAID'S strategy for promoting democracy in
Cambodia targets resources toward the adoption of a legal framework for
the existence and operation of NGOS in Cambodia
7. Although over 50 print and electronic media
operate in Cambodia, the quality of their news reporting is unreliable
and they operate in an environment increasingly hostile to press
freedoms. USAID'S 1995 strategy for promoting democracy in Cambodia says
that the country lacks an aggressive media to hold the government
accountable, and that the press, although active, lacks the training to
be articulate advocates for the development of democratic institutions
and is vulnerable to government intimidation. Human Rights Watch reports
that the Cambodian government has engaged in a series of actions to
curtail freedom of the press and stifle the right to hold and express
opinions. For example, the group reported that after a September 1995
grenade attack on an opposition party congress, government officials
ordered broadcast stations to limit their coverage to a government-
provided script.
8. We recognize that Cambodia faces serious
problems in building a democratic society, and that it would be
unrealistic to expect the government to become a model democracy in the
2 years since UNTAC departed. However, it is realistic-given UNTAC'S
costly intervention and Cambodian leaders' pledges to support democracy,
human rights, and the rule of law-to expect the government to make
sustained progress toward the specific goals this report discusses.
However, evidence suggests that the Cambodian government has made
limited progress toward these goals over the past 2 years, and instead
may be returning to traditional authoritarian methods. For example,
government forces reportedly raided the headquarters of a new opposition
party in late January 1996 and held party members at gun point. Also,
USAID'S 1995 strategy for promoting democracy in Cambodia notes that
some observers sensed a return to "traditional authoritarian
ways" in 1995.
9. We did not say that the Cambodian government
could not hold free and fair elections by 1998 or protect human and
political rights. However, evidence indicates that to date the
government has not made much progress toward these goals. Regarding
mine-clearing efforts, our point is that funding for such efforts
remains an issue and the Cambodian government currently lacks an
integrated strategic plan.
10. Where appropriate, we have modified our report
to say "some U.S. Officials" or to specify their titles.
11. We have revised our report to reflect this
information.
12. Although the most important consideration is
that Cambodia hold free and fair national elections, several factors
highlight the significance of holding them by May 1998. First, the
maximum term of the current National Assembly expires in early September
1998, and elections must be held within 60 days, or no later than early
November 1998. U.S., other foreign government, and Cambodian officials
emphasized the importance of holding elections within these
constitutional time frames. Second, holding elections after May 1998
would be difficult because of logistical problems associated with
Cambodia's monsoon season. UNTAC'S decision to hold elections by May
1993 in part reflected such logistical concerns.
13. We agree that it is more important that the
election law is drafted thoughtfully, after a thorough, public exchange
of views. General adherence to the proposed timetable is important
precisely because it allows time for a thorough, public exchange of
views before the need to enact a law and begin election preparations
becomes pressing. Also, much remains to be done before elections can be
held, including completing a draft law, allowing for public comment and
debate on the draft law, debating and enacting the law in the National
Assembly, creating an election committee, issuing election regulations,
developing an election budget, training election workers, educating and
registering voters, registering political parties, and mobilizing
international support. Because additional delays are likely, we are
concerned that the Cambodian government is falling behind schedule at
the very start of the process.
14. We have revised our report to clarify the
sources of our information. While the Department may consider comments
regarding resource constraints speculative, USAID'S 1995 strategy for
promoting democracy in Cambodia notes that the agency has neither the
staff or resources necessary to support both national and local
elections.
15. Although there have been a few exceptions, new
laws and policies generally are finalized in secret by the Council of
Ministers, and there is limited opportunity for National Assembly debate
and public participation once draft legislation emerges from this closed
forum, according to USAID'S 1995 strategy for promoting democracy in
Cambodia.
16. The new press law allows for continued criminal
prosecution of the media when material "affects national security
and political stability" and allows the government to confiscate or
temporarily suspend publications without court approval. Human Rights
Watch and other groups are concerned that these provisions undermine the
law's positive features. Regarding the government's promise to define
national security and public stability in the future, we cannot assess
the potential impact of such uncertain legislation. However, some U.S.
and foreign officials, Cambodians, members of the press, and others say
that the absence of a definition creates uncertainty that has a chilling
effect on press freedoms.
17. We have revised our report to say that the
Cambodian government has "pressured" journalists to join a
government-controlled association. We base this statement on information
provided by officials at the U.S. embassy in Phnom Penh, the Asia
Foundation, the UNCHR office in Phnom Penh, and an NGO newsletter.
18. We included the 16.4 square kilometers of land
CMAC has cleared of mines in the total estimate we report. Using the
requirement established by the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees of 2 hectares of farmland to support a typical refugee family,
15.4 square kilometers of land would support less than 800 refugee
families not the 13,000 the Department cites.
19. Our report notes that the U.S. government has
supported mine-clearing efforts in Cambodia by providing funds,
training, equipment, and supplies.
|
Appendix III
Comments From the U.S. Agency for International Development
|
| Note: GAO comments
supplementing those in the report text appear at the end of this
appendix. |
U.S. AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT
320 Twenty-First Street, N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20523
Mr. Henry L Hinton, Jr
Assistant Comptroller General
National Security and International Affairs Division
U.S. General Accounting Office
441 G Street, N W - Room 4039
Washington, DC 20548
Dear Mr Hinton
I am pleased to provide the U.S. Agency for International
Development's (USAID's) formal response to the draft GAO report
entitle "Cambodia: Limited Progress on Elections, Human Rights,
and Mine Clearing" (December 1995).
The following comments are keyed to specific topics addressed
within the report:
Budget Resources: The USAID budget for Cambodia for FY 1996
cited on page 2 was the initial Administration request. It does not
reflect current planning levels, which are lower. Likewise the $7.5
million figure in support of national elections was proposed by the
USAID Mission in Cambodia for planning purposes; it does not reflect
a USAID-approved level for election support. (See comment 1.)
Assistance levels for Cambodia will be a function of Congressionally-
approved levels of foreign assistance globally.
Election Plannings: The Cambodian government has begun work in
planning for elections. While more needs to be done, the goverment
has begun the process of drafting an election law and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) are providing comments regarding various aspects
of the law. At a national seminar on electoral systems and administration
sponsored by the Ministry of Interior and a Cambodian NGO, the Khmer
Institute of Democracy, national leaders pledged support for free and
fair elections.
The draft report cites the National Election Timetable for Cambodia
(page 11) which was prepared, with USAID funding, by the International
Foundation for Electoral Systems in August, 1995. The draft also notes
that the election law was not in place by November, 1995. From USAID's
perspectives, broad debate and public
- 2 -
participation in the development of election law are critical to the
process of awareness-raising and the development of consensus. Delays in
meeting the precise election timetable would not be unexpected in view
of competing legislative priorities, the inexperience of Cambodian
officials and the need for consultation with technical experts in the
develop of the law. (See comment 2.) It is important to note that
Cambodia's leadership has publicly voiced support for elections and
that there is continuing forward monentum.
Human Rights: Violations by the military and police were
acknowledged by USAID as part of a larger issue of desperately needed
bureaucratic reforms (page 19).[ Now on p. 17.] While major human rights
issues continue to exist in Cambodia, the situation is much improved
over that which existed prior to the UN occupation. In a November/
December, 1995 visit to Cambodia, Amnesty International noted that
civil liberties are much improved in rural areas, with real gains
being made outside of Phnon Penh. The concept of rule of law does not
yet prevail, but improvements are slowly being realized. For example,
with USAID funding, the Cambodian Court Improvement Project of the
International Human Rights Law Group is addressing the need for legal
training among judges and prosecutors. (See comment 3.)
Political Rights: GAO accurately reports that there is a climate
of increasing intolerance for dissenting opinion, both inside and
outside the government (page 4). However, USAID notes that despite this
factor, political pluralism is thriving. Its potential intellectual and
political force is stymied by a government unaccustomed to, and
suspicious of, open debate. A legacy of long-standing authoritarian rule
cannot be unlearned overnight where there is a lack of experience in how
a democracy can or should work. USAID's strategy is designed to provide
training, technical assistance, and exposure to a variety of other
experiences which can facilitate the development of a more open and
tolerant society that will benefit, rather than suffer, from divergent
points of view. Backsliding to repressive, authoritarian governance is
not unexpected among officials who had little, if any, exposure to
democratic processes prior to the UNTAC period.
- 3 -
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the GAO draft report and for
the courtesies extended by your taff in the conduct of this review.
Sincerely,
(Signed)
Larry E. Byrne
Assistant Administrator
Bureau for Management
|
|
The following are GAO'S
comments on USAID'S letter dated February 1, 1996.
|
GAO Comments
| 1- We have revised our report
to reflect this information.
2. General adherence to the proposed timetable is
important precisely because it allows time for a thorough, public
exchange of views before the need to enact a law and begin election
preparations becomes pressing. Much remains to be done before elections
can be held, including completing a draft law, allowing for public
comment and debate on the draft law, debating and enacting the law in
the National Assembly, creating an election committee, issuing election
regulations, developing an election budget, training election workers,
educating and registering voters, registering political parties, and
mobilizing international support. Because additional delays are likely-
given the inexperience of Cambodian officials, the need for technical
assistance, and competing priorities-we are concerned that the Cambodian
government is falling behind schedule at the very start of the
process.
3. Although human rights conditions have improved
over what existed prior to UNTAC, we believe that the standards of
behavior set out in the Paris Peace Accords, the various international
treaties that Cambodia has pledged to uphold, and the Cambodian
constitution are the appropriate standards for assessing the current
government's progress in meeting international human rights standards
since 1993-not the conditions of genocide and civil war that existed
prior to 1991. Moreover, some individuals and groups report that human
rights conditions in Cambodia have worsened since UNTAC left. For
example, in its 1996 annual report, Human Rights Watch concludes that
Cambodia's human rights situation deteriorated markedly during 1995.
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